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tat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), my particular thanks for granting
me the opportunity to study the PhD degree in Barcelona.
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Patricia Rodŕıguez and Vı́ctor Rodŕıguez for their friendship and their
collaboration with ideas and stimulating discussions, for their help and
support all this time.
Abstract
Vehicular Ad-Hoc NETworks (VANETs) are an emerging technology
which aims to improve road safety by preventing and reducing traffic
accidents. While VANETs offer a great variety of promising appli-
cations, such as, safety-related and infotainment applications, they
remain a number of security and privacy related research challenges
that must be addressed.
A common approach to security issues widely adopted in VANETs,
is the use of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and digital certificates
in order to enable authentication, authorization and confidentiality.
These approaches usually rely on a large set of regional Certification
Authorities (CAs). Despite the advantages of PKI-based approaches,
there are two main problems that arise, i) the secure interoperabil-
ity among the different and usually unknown- issuing CAs, and ii)
the sole use of PKI in a VANET environment cannot prevent privacy
related attacks, such as, linking a vehicle with an identifier, track-
ing vehicles “big brother scenario” and user profiling. Additionally,
since vehicles in VANETs will be able to store great amounts of in-
formation including private information, unauthorized access to such
information should be carefully considered.
This thesis addresses authentication and interoperability issues in ve-
hicular communications, considering an inter-regional scenario where
mutual authentication between nodes is needed. To provide inter-
operability between vehicles and services among different domains,
an Inter-domain Authentication System (AS) is proposed. The AS
supplies vehicles with a trusted set of authentication credentials by
implementing a near real-time certificate status service. The proposed
AS also implements a mechanism to quantitatively evaluate the trust
level of a CA, in order to decide on-the-fly if an interoperability rela-
tionship can be created.
This research work also contributes with a Privacy Enhancing Model
(PEM) to deal with important privacy issues in VANETs. The PEM
consists of two PKI-based privacy protocols: i) the Attribute-Based
Privacy (ABP) protocol, and ii) the Anonymous Information Re-
trieval (AIR) protocol. The ABP introduces Attribute-Based Cre-
dentials (ABC) to provide conditional anonymity and minimal infor-
mation disclosure, which overcome with the privacy issues related to
linkability (linking a vehicle with an identifier) and vehicle tracking
(big brother scenario). The AIR protocol addresses user profiling
when querying Service Providers (SPs), by relying in a user collabo-
ration privacy protocol based on query forgery and permutation; and
assuming that neither participant nodes nor SPs could be completely
trusted.
Finally, the Trust Validation Model (TVM) is proposed. The TVM
supports decision making by evaluating entities trust based on context
information, in order to provide i)access control to driver and vehicle’s
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Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) currently provide a prominent field of
research, that aims at improving everyday road safety and comfort. To achieve
this, the development of several potential applications is envisioned. Such ap-
plications, will not only promise to provide extraordinary benefits, but will also
represent important security challenges, especially due to the unique characteris-
tics of VANETs. In this chapter, the basics of VANETs will be briefly introduced,
followed by a discussion about the main reasons why, despite their potential ben-
efits, VANETs also raise important security and privacy concerns that must be
properly addressed. The problem statement and the main contributions of this
thesis are presented in subsequent sections, and finally, at the end of this chapter,
the thesis organization is outlined.
1.1 Motivation
Road traffic injuries are currently the ninth leading cause of death in the world,
killing nearly 1.3 million people annually. Unless effective action is taken, road
accidents are predicted to become the fifth leading cause of death by 2030 (WHO,
2012). Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)(Committee, 2007) aim to pro-
vide innovative services that will potentially benefit traffic management. As the
technical basis of ITS, VANETs offer the possibility of significant improvements
in order to mitigate vehicular accidents and enable a wide range of safety and
mobility applications promising extraordinary benefits.
1
1.1 Motivation
VANETs consist of mobile and fixed nodes represented by vehicles and Road
Side Units (RSUs) (Figure 1.1) communicating among each other and enabling
the exchange of different kinds of information (Zarki et al., 2002). Thus, as
previously mentioned, their successful deployment will allow the implementation
of several applications intended to drastically reduce the number of road fatalities
by improving overall road safety, as well as being capable of providing value added
services to enhance driver comfort.
In safety-related applications, exchanged information plays a vital role, in
particular, in traffic safety. Many of these applications may demand the driver’s
awareness and even his/her reaction. If a driver is supposed to react instantly,
e.g., in the case of road accidents or life-critical warning messages, since lives
could depend on these applications, the information must be accurate and truth-
ful, and vehicles should be able to (i) ensure that the information received is
correct, (ii) verify that the sender has been authenticated and authorized, and
therefore can be trusted. To assure both aspects, security measures are essential
and must be taken into consideration. While increasing road safety is its main
goal, VANETs also offer other applications such as location-based services while
en route, which adversaries could exploit by injecting wrong information into the
network or by gaining information from value added services and consequently
threaten drivers’ privacy and safety. Moreover, since vehicles in a VANET will
be provided with storage and processing capabilities, avoiding unauthorized in-
formation disclosure should also be carefully addressed. The lack of security
could consequently jeopardize the potential benefits expected from VANET ap-
plications, thus, a set of security goals should be satisfied in order to prevent
attackers from inserting or modifying exchanged (e.g., life-critical) information,
without compromising drivers’ privacy but able to establish their liability in case
of accidents.
In summary, vehicular communications should not become a weak link in
terms of security and privacy, but should provide users with, at least, the same
level of protection that is currently afforded without vehicular networks. In the










Figure 1.1: VANET system model
1.2 Problem Statement
The aim of VANETs is to provide safety and comfort, thus, in vehicular commu-
nications, the information exchanged among vehicles plays a fundamental role.
Identifying the context in which information could be trusted is a relevant aspect
to be considered. In particular, for safety-related applications, the information
transmitted among vehicles is considered critical, thus, timely and accurate ex-
change of this information could prevent a great number of fatal road accidents.
However,if an attacker manipulates the information could potentially cause harm;
therefore, in order to prevent potential attacks, implementing security measures
is of the utmost importance. To overcome this, the adoption of Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) technology, which has been proven to be a suitable solution
in other distributed environments, has been considered. The implementation of
PKI will enable the establishment of secure communication channels, by provid-
ing services needed to prevent a wide range of security attacks. Current PKI
systems consist of a Central Authority (CA) responsible for registering users and
issuing credentials (containing the corresponding private and public key-pair).
In VANETs, it is envisioned that vehicles will be registered with their own re-




















Figure 1.2: Interoperability among CAs, to provide inter-domain authentication
when vehicles travel to different domains
within regional scopes (Figure 1.2). However, by following the implementation
of several CAs, how will authentication and authorization be performed
when vehicles move between two different geographical regions?. It is
assumed that when a vehicle travels to a different geographical region or domain,
a mutual authentication and trusted communication will be achieved thanks to
previous cross-certification agreements (mostly manual). Nevertheless, since cer-
tificate revocation is also the responsibility of the issuing CA, a disadvantage of
cross-certification is that, it is not possible to obtain up-to-date revocation in-
formation resulting in a vulnerability window for the relying party, which raises
the question on how to automatically perform “cross-certification” and i)
validate trust among unknown CAs and ii) validate in near-real time a VANET’s
node certificate status.
Apart from the revocation issues just mentioned, and despite the benefits of
enabling the use of PKI technologies in VANETs, the sole use of PKI cannot
ensure privacy, which also plays an important role in any VANET architectural
solution. A few examples of privacy problems that should be faced in a typical
VANET are: (i) linking a person and an identifier, (ii) tracking a specific node,
and, since vehicles in a VANET will also benefit from accessing a wide number
of added value applications offered by different Service Providers (SPs), (iii) the
big brother scenario of gathering detailed statistics about movement patterns and











Figure 1.3: Big brother scenario, an attacker (vehicle or RSU) collecting infor-
mation from a vehicle’s requests to different service providers at different times
(t1, t2, ..., tn)
the general approach is the implementation of temporary certificates based on
pseudonyms, which are an interesting, but yet only a complementary solution.
Pseudonyms could prevent linking a person to an identifier, but cannot prevent
an attacker from collecting another user’s related data; the passive collection
of communication information regarding vehicle activities (e.g. locations and
contents of queries to services provided by the infrastructure), could lead to user
profiling (Figure 1.3). Moreover, private information stored in vehicles should
only be disclosed to authorized parties (Figure 1.4).
The general principle in VANET privacy is that information of the vehicle and
the driver should be protected against private citizens and law enforcement agen-
cies, only disclosing it to authorized parties, where privacy should be conditional
to specific scenarios (liability). Given the above mentioned scenario, important
questions to be solved are i) how to avoid user profiling when requesting services
to the infrastructure? ii) how to provide conditional anonymity and unlinkability?
and iii) how to prevent unauthorized information disclosure among vehicles?.













Figure 1.4: Information trust validation in vehicle to vehicle communication - no
infrastructure available
network constraints that should be taken into account for the overall security de-
sign. A successful deployment must process and transmit the information within
the timing and communications parameters limited by the network, thus, the
need to carefully design a suitable security solution, able to meet the VANETs’
performance requirements, especially those related to the bandwidth usage and
the processing overhead. Thus, the main purpose of this research work is to deal
with the aforementioned security and privacy issues, and prevent abuse by imple-
menting a PKI-based solution that addresses the interoperability issues among
different realms and ensure the privacy of the involved entities in VANETs. The
specific contributions of this thesis are described in the following section.
1.3 Specific Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis consist in addressing important security
and privacy challenges in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks by proposing a privacy-
aware security framework (Figure 1.5). In particular, to overcome the security
and privacy issues discussed in Section 1.2, we point out the main contributions:
• Authentication System (AS) is a geo-location based trust model, which
provides PKI-interoperability (Figure 1.2), allowing vehicles to perform au-



















Figure 1.5: Privacy-aware Security Framework
validation process, and automatically builds a dynamic CA federation to
provide cross-certification via policy mapping.
• Attribute-Based Privacy (ABP) protocol implements Attribute-Based
Credentials (ABC) to provide minimal information disclosure by selectively
disclosing attributes to any relaying party such as a service provider (SP)
and prevents vehicle tracking (Figure 1.3), especially while requesting ser-
vices from the infrastructure.
• Anonymous Information Retrieval (AIR) implements query permuta-
tion and query forgery to avoid user profiling. Taking advantage of user col-
laboration, the AIR protocol avoids query-user association, and overcomes
potential privacy issues derived by eavesdropping (Figure 1.3). Moreover
the protocol has been designed on the basis that neither the participating
nodes nor the SP can be trusted.
• Trust Validation Model (TVM) is a model which consists of the im-
plementation of context-based policies to i) prevent unauthorized access to
vehicles private information and ii) validate the context of the received in-
formation and the trust level of the source nodes to be able to automatically
7
1.4 Thesis Organization
decide if the message could be trusted (Figure 1.4). Firstly, TVM classifies
the type of information contained in the vehicle and the type of messages
to be exchanged, by assigning different labels to the information according
to its sensitivity level. Secondly, it validates the sender or requestor’s trust
level, according to a set of attributes previously assigned and mainly based
on the role and the type of entity, which is achieved thanks to the proposed
privacy enhancing model.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 Provides an overviews of the basic concepts of Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks. Current projects and efforts, along with the security and privacy
issues that are inherent in VANET technologies, are also discussed in this
chapter.
Chapter 3 Presents and analyzes the related state-of-the-art approaches, focus-
ing on security and privacy in VANETs.
Chapter 4 Introduces an Inter-domain Authentication System to provide trust
establishment and authentication among vehicles belonging to unknown
domains.
Chapter 5 Proposes a Privacy Enhancing Model (PEM) that consists of an
Attribute-Based Privacy (ABP) protocol which introduces Attribute-Based
Credentials (ABC) to anonymously communicate and prevent vehicle track-
ing. In order to prevent user profiling, the PEM model introduces the
Anonymous Information Retrieval (AIR) protocol that implements query
forgery and permutation to provide minimal information disclosure when
requesting services to the Service Providers (SPs).
Chapter 6 Defines a context-based Trust Validation Model (TVM), by imple-
menting context-based policies to i) avoid unauthorized private information




Chapter 7 Analyzes the trade-offs among security, privacy and performance
related to the proposed model.





2.1 Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks are a subgroup and one of the most relevant repre-
sentations of Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs). Basically MANETs consist
of autonomous collections of mobile nodes, represented by independent wireless
devices acting as both end systems and routers that move independently form-
ing unpredictable and highly dynamic topologies just as shown in Figure 2.1.
In VANETs’ communication vehicles are equipped with On-Board Units (OBUs)
able to communicate to the infrastructure mainly represented by Road Side Units
(RSUs) located along the roads.
Figure 2.1: Mobile Ad Hoc Network
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Figure 2.2: Smart-vehicle
2.1.1 Communication Model
It is envisioned that in the coming years 40% of all vehicular components will be
electronic, with this integration, vehicles referred as “smart-vehicles” (Hubaux
et al., 2004), will be equipped with processing, recording and communication
features, capable of processing and storing a great amount of information (Figure
2.2)
The communication among both kinds of VANETs nodes is commonly clas-
sified as vehicle-to-vehicle (v2v) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (v2i) Figure 2.3,
and according to the Dedicated Short Range Communications - DSRC standard
(Armstrong, 2012a), VANETs are capable of communicating at data rates from
6-27Mbps at a maximum transmission range of 1000m, thus, enabling nodes to
exchange all kinds of application-related information.
2.1.1.1 Projects and Organization
The networking community is at present putting significant effort into investigat-
ing inter-vehicle communications. The areas of current research range from the
low layer protocols design to the implementation of a wide range of applications
and mechanisms for the effective deployment of vehicular ad-hoc networks. The
development of these vehicular communication systems is driven by a number
of national and international activities such as, the Car-to-Car Communication
consortium (C2C-CC) (C2CCC, 2012) and the California Partners of Advanced
11





Figure 2.3: Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Communication
Transit and Highways (PATH, 2012). These organizations focus on building high
performance architectures and extracting application specific functionality to be
integrated into the VANET system (i.e. application specific packet routing).
2.1.1.2 Communication Standards
In vehicular communications, vehicle are able to share different communication
channels which are highly unreliable and generally with a limited bandwidth. The
need of new protocols and mechanisms to guarantee effective, reliable, and se-
cure communications are needed. The IEEE 802.11 (IEEE LAN/MAN Standards
Committee – IEEE802, 2012) standard family provides wireless connectivity be-
tween v2v and v2i, however these standards have not considered VANET’s unique
characteristics (Section 2.1.1.3 such as driving speeds, traffic patterns, and driv-
ing environments. To address these requirements, recently, the Dedicated Short
Range Communication (DSRC) and the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environ-
ments (WAVE) which are the based on 802.11p and IEEE 1609 standards have
been developed. The DSRC is based on the physical and MAC layer of the
802.11 standard, providing high data transfers and low communication latency in
small communication zones. Taking advantage of the efforts done so far by the
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ASTM2313 working group on DSRC they migrated to the IEEE 802.11 standard
group and renamed the DSRC to IEEE 802.11p WAVE (Zeadally et al., 2010).
The WAVE standards define an architecture and a complementary, standardized
set of services and interfaces that collectively enable secure wireless communica-
tions required to support Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications.
This includes data exchange between high-speed v2v and v2i communications in
the licensed ITS band of 5.9 GHz (5.855.925 GHz). Additionally, IEEE 1609 is a
higher layer standard on which IEEE 802.11p is based which allows homogeneous
communications interfaces between different automotive manufacturers.
2.1.1.3 VANETs Features
As a subgroup of MANETs, VANETs share similar characteristics with other
ad-hoc networks (Zarki et al., 2002), but also possess’ unique features that on
one hand can influence positively on the deployment of several applications, and
on the other hand represent an interesting challenge that must be carefully con-
sidered when designing any architectural solution. In the following, these partic-
ularities will be briefly described.
• Dynamic topology: Compared to conventional MANETs, nodes in VANETs
could be easily distinguished by their variable and high speeds, together
with the different trajectories that nodes are able to follow; communication
links among them can only be established in a temporary fashion, resulting
in continuous topology changes, i.e. the longer that vehicles are within
the communication range (e.g. vehicles following similar trajectories), the
longer that a particular topology is maintained.
• Mobility models: Despite the high mobility that is inherent to a VANET
system, nodes mobility is bounded in speed and space, due to the fact
that vehicles travel along pre-established trajectories (roads). The speed of
vehicles is usually constrained by i) traffic lights, ii) routes intersections,
iii) the speed of other vehicles, and by iv) general speed limits to control
different kinds of urban areas. Moreover, since vehicles move along routes
their movements could be predicted.
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• Geolocalization capabilities: it is expected that most vehicles will have
integrated, positioning devices such as Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers, along with other communication capabilities, enabling a potential
range of location based applications.
• Low latency requirements: due to the dynamicity of the environment, and
the delay constraints introduced by safety applications, the information
exchanged among vehicles in VANETs is extremely time-sensitive, (e.g.
alert messages to prevent about road conditions)
• Energy supply: an important difference between VANETs and other ad-hoc
networks is that, in traditional MANETs, mobile nodes have limited power
supply and processing resources, resulting in a major issue when designing
services and applications that can be supported by each node, however,
in VANETs resource constraints could be neglected, since in VANETs a
running vehicle is able to provide sufficient battery power, more compu-
tational power resources are assumed. This feature is quite an important
advantage for certain computational intensive tasks related with security
(i.e. cryptography).
• Communication scenarios: communication in VANETs might be strongly
dependent on the scenario (Guerrero-Ibez et al., 2012), current research
identifies two main scenarios i) highways, where vehicles travel at different
speeds and unidirectional movement patterns can be observed, and ii) urban
scenarios, where environmental elements play a fundamental role making
v2v communications more complex.
The most challenging features inherent to a VANET system include the dy-
namic topology and the mobility models (vehicles moving at a variable and high
speed and in different trajectories). On the other hand, thanks to the vehicle’s
geo-localization functionality and its “infinite” energy supply, VANETs are an
enabler for a set of potential applications (further discussed in Section 2.1.1.4),
but also rise important security and privacy issues that must be addressed.
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2.1.1.4 Applications
In VANETs v2v and v2i communication, communicating nodes are either vehi-
cles or RSUs, where the majority of nodes will consist in vehicles equipped with
on-board units (OBUs) and fixed communication units along the road that can
exchange information about traffic issues, road conditions and added value in-
formation, allowing the deployment of a wide range of applications that could
be classified according to different aspects such as target, scenarios, or security
objectives. In this thesis the most common classification initially employed by
authors of (Raya & Hubaux, 2005),(Plossl et al., 2006) has been adopted:
• Warning: Applications aimed to detect risky situations, such as the propa-
gation of alerts in case of accidents. Vehicles exchange messages to inform
each other about special events and dangers on the road, an example could
be alarm signals from emergency vehicles in action, which is done by send-
ing information such as current position, time and destination or desired
route, where other vehicles could and must clear the way for the emergency
vehicle.
• Traffic Management: a safety-related application where messages are pri-
marily exchanged to inform about traffic congestion and road conditions in
a given region with the main purpose of optimizing traffic. This expects
safety in an indirect form basically by preventing potential accidents due
to congestion.
• Added value applications: aimed at providing a wide range of services such
as payment services, location-based services (e.g. finding the closest hotel,
restaurant, etc.), and infotainment (e.g., Internet access, to offer e-mail,
web browsing, video streaming, etc.).
As it can be inferred by the aforementioned applications, VANETs will be
capable of offering a wide range of valuable services. However, along with the
rise of VANETs, a set of security issues has also appeared, the importance of
security and privacy implications will be further discussed in Section 2.1.2.
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2.1.2 Security and Privacy
Vehicular systems are an important problem of our society, where the common
goal is to reduce road accidents. Emerging technologies such as DSRC assigned
for vehicle communications are promising to drastically reduce the number of
traffic victims by providing early emergency warnings in various road situations
(broadcasting routine messages over a single hop every 300ms with traffic related
events information (NHTS, 2006)), as long as the exchanged messages are trust-
worthy they can greatly improve the overall road safety. A compromised VANET
may disrupt the whole technology’s applicability and acceptance, by, for exam-
ple, causing life-threatening situations (i.e. false warnings that could results on
road accidents), thus, any VANET solution must be designed to ensure that the
transmission comes from a trusted source and has not been tampered with since
transmission.
Privacy in VANETs is also a major concern, since vehicles are highly personal
devices and they are kept for a long duration, and are expected to be able to
store a lot of information including personal data; drivers should then be able to
keep and control their personal and vehicle related information. Innocent looking
data from several sources can be collected over long periods and be automatically
evaluated to compromise privacy and produce several attacks (Dötzer, 2005).
Once privacy is lost it is very difficult to re-establish that state of personal rights
and the trust that people delivered into this technology (Kargl et al., 2006). Thus,
on one hand strong security mechanisms are needed to protect applications and
users from possible attacks and on the other hand the protection of user’s private
information (not limited to identity) should be guaranteed.
2.1.2.1 Attacker Model
The classification of attackers can be done according to different characteristics
such as location, motivation, etc., identifying a type of attacker facilitates con-
siderably the study of his capacity, possible attacks and, consequently the harm
that could be caused. Authors of (Raya & Hubaux, 2007), presented a general
classification:
• Insider: is an authenticated member of the network
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• Outsider: is considered by the other members of the network as an intruder.
• Malicious: this attacker seeks no personal benefits from the attacks and
aims to harm.
• Rational: a rational attacker seeks personal profit and hence is more pre-
dictable.
• Active: an active attacker can generate packets or signals.
• Passive: A passive attacker contents himself with eavesdropping on the
wireless channel.
Similar to other conventional MANETs, VANETs can also be vulnerable to a
set of security attacks, which have been in different degree analyzed by authors
of (Aijaz et al., 2006), (Parno & Perrig, 2005) and (Raya & Hubaux, 2005). In
the following, a classification of general attacks on VANETs corresponding to
different security requirements needed in VANETs (de Fuentes et al., 2010) is
described:
Identification and Authentication An active, rational and insider attacker
pretending to be one or multiple different entities could achieve an im-
personation attack by i) claiming to be an authorized entity such as an
emergency vehicle and propagate wrong information in the network, e.g.
sending false information to alter traffic flow, slowing it down or getting a
vehicle-free road, ii) in the same way a vehicle could pretend to be multiple
entities reporting a false bottleneck to achieve the same purpose, iii) simple
use of fictitious identities, to evade being responsible and legally obliged in
case of an accident.
Privacy Linking a person with an identifier (ID disclosure) by a global passive
observer overhearing the communication from vehicles (e.g an attacker RSU
or vehicle on a parking lot), and afterwards could be able to distinguish i)
a vehicle-identifier, which identifier belongs to which vehicle and as a result
to which driver, ii) be able to monitor trajectories. With this information
an attacker could then blackmail a driver if collected information contains
compromising information.
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Confidentiality an attacker represented by a vehicle or by a false RSU could get
illegal access to confidential information, or a passive attacker eavesdropping
the communication and gathering information on services requested by a
vehicle.
Non-repudiation achieved mainly by rational attackers colluding to share the
same credentials.
Availability Denial of service attacks are commonly done by active malicious
attackers willing to bring down the network, these attacks include channel
jamming and aggressive injection of dummy messages.
Data trust Inaccurate data calculation and sending affecting message reliability,
performed by manipulating sent information mainly done by rational active
attackers.
2.1.2.2 Security and Privacy Requirements
The successful deployment and public acceptance of VANET technology requires
a security system able to prevent any generic attack. On vehicular networks,
the system should use a secure and trusted communication infrastructure able to
satisfy the following set of requirements (Kargl et al., 2006) (Raya & Hubaux,
2007):
• Authentication: The authentication of the senders messages is needed to
keep outsiders from injecting messages as well as misbehaving insiders.
• Integrity: All messages should be protected to prevent attackers from al-
tering them, or in the worst-case scenario, to detect its modification.
• Confidentiality: There are application that require that only the sender and
the intended receiver can access the content of a message.
• Access control: Vehicles and applications need fine-grained access rights.
Sensitive information stored in vehicles should only be available for autho-
rized parties.
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• Availability: Transmitted messages must reach all necessary recipients de-
spite the VANET’s status.
• Non repudiation: A sender should not be able to deny the transmission of
a message, specially in case of node’s misbehavior, therefore to be able to
prosecute misuse, non-repudiation is necessary.
• Privacy: The privacy of users should be enforced, it should not be possible to
automatically obtain private information about drivers or vehicle’s behavior
and activities, linking the activities (services requested and location) to and
identifier and an identifier to a person.
2.2 VANET’s Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI)
Cryptography primitives are based on the use of keys employed to encrypt and
decrypt information. There are two types of cryptography: i) symmetric-key
cryptography, and ii) asymmetric-key cryptography also known as Public Key
(PK). Symmetric-key cryptography has been discarded due to its scalability limi-
tations, specially in complex systems such as VANETs where the increased num-
ber of vehicles introduces a significant key maintenance overhead. Opposite to
Symmetric-key, in VANETs, Public Key cryptography has been adopted by many
initiatives and in particular by the WAVE security standards (Section 2.1.1.2).
2.2.1 Basic Concepts
The basic PK provides an encryption and a signature scheme, both consisting of
a private (Sk) and a public key (Pk).
In the encryption scheme an entity (A) publishes its (Pk); which will be used
by others entities to encrypt a message (M) sent to entity (A), C ←− e(M,PkA).
Upon reception of an encrypted message, entity (A) uses its (Sk) to decrypt
and recover the original message (M), d(C, SkA).
Opposite to encryption, the signature scheme, entity (A) signs a message
(M) with its (Sk), C ←− e(M,SkA) that will be verified only with by entities
possessing entity’s (Pk), d(C,PkA).
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Public Key Infrastructure or PKI is the general term for a security infrastruc-
ture which derives its name from Public Key Cryptography. PKI defines message
formats and protocols that allow entitled to securely communicate claims and
statements. The most commonly used assertions, are those that bind identity,
attributes, and authorization statements either to keys or to identities.
The most popular PKI is defined by the IETF’s PKIX working group (Housley
et al., 2002), which defines a security system used for identifying entities (users
and resources) through the use of X.509 identity certificates. In this PKI, highly
trusted entities known as Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue X.509 certificates
where essentially a unique identity name and the public key of an entity are
bound through the digital signature of that CA. As a trusted third party, the CA
can be used as an introducer: through the proof of private key possession and
the validation of the CA’s issues X.509 certificates, entities are able to associate
a trusted, unique identity name with the communicates claims and statements
of others. General security requirements such as identification, authentication,
non-repudiation and confidentiality, could be achieved with the implementation
of a PKI-based solution.
2.2.2 Assumptions
Multiple CAs within regional scopes will be involved, and such CAs (national
or regional) are mostly cross-certified (see Figure 2.4). Vehicles from different
regional scopes should be able to verify each other. A CA will issue certified
public/private key pairs to participating vehicles. To authenticate each other,
vehicles sending a message will add digital signature at each of the messages,
the digital signature will be generated by encrypted hash value of message using
the private key. Vehicles receiving messages will verify the key used to sign the
message, and the message’s Certificate Authorities (CAs) Revocation is assumed
to be done with the distribution of CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) that
contain the most recently revoked certificates; CRLs will be updated and provided
when infrastructure is available.
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Figure 2.4: VPKI - Multiple CAs within regional scopes
2.2.3 Open Issues
An efficient VANET architecture is fundamental for being able to manage the
whole certificate’s life cycle (issue, distribution, validation and revocation). Yet,
PKI-based solutions have overlooked the interoperability problems that could
be derived from a multi-CA framework, by assuming explicit cross certification
agreements. Revocation also represents an important scalability issue, CRLs can
be very long due to the increased number of vehicles and their high mobility.
Moreover, as it has been previously discussed, the sole use of PKI, cannot
prevent the privacy issues identified in (Section 2.1.2)
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State of the Art
Until recently, security in VANETs had been overlooked, yet, has drawn the
attention of a wider research community. In this chapter, the main VANET
security approaches found in the literature will be presented and further discussed.
3.1 Introduction
Since, in VANETs, access is granted by default, to be able to prevent any generic
attack, the system should rely on a secure and trusted communication infrastruc-
ture able to satisfy a set of security requirements that include i) authentication,
ii) integrity, iii) confidentiality, iv) availability, v) non-repudiation and vi) pri-
vacy. Thus, the important challenge is just finding the proper techniques and
architectural solutions to be able to enforce privacy and security. In particular,
authentication should be provided, even in the presence of nodes (vehicles) be-
longing to different ”authentication realms” (usually linked with more than one
geographical area), but without disregarding the privacy requirements inherent
to VANETs users and applications.
An extensive study of security issues in vehicular networks has been presented
by (Hubaux et al., 2004),(Raya & Hubaux, 2005), (Papadimitratos et al., 2006a)
and among others (Wex et al., 2008). Also authors of (Parno & Perrig, 2005)
and (Aijaz et al., 2006) provided a detailed analysis of general system security
attacks on Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) and describe the main challenges
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in securing vehicular networks, pointing out important system requirements con-
cerning among others, privacy. In particular, a discussion of specific issues related
to identity and privacy enhancing technologies for VC can be found in (Dötzer,
2005) and (Papadimitratos et al., 2006b). According to current state of the art
research, to implement a secure service access in vehicular networks the Wireless
Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard (Committee, 2007) assumes
that vehicles will be capable of running cryptographic protocols. Thus, the use of
Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and digital certificates have been proposed in
(Papadimitratos et al., 2007) as suitable solutions to overcome the authentication
and authorization challenges in VANETs. However the implementation of PKI
also rises interesting challenges.
3.2 Pseudonymity
The importance of privacy preservation for the public acceptance of VANET’s
technology has been highlighted by authors of (Dötzer, 2005) and (Gerlach, 2006),
which have presented an extensive study on the implications of missing privacy.
In particular, it has been remarked that, since, in general, digital certificates
include information regarding the node’s identity, the sole use of PKI cannot
provide privacy. Thus, different approaches based on the use of pseudonyms
1 have been proposed. In VANETs pseudonymity refers to the use of digital
pseudonyms as IDs and assuming that each pseudonym refers to exactly one
holder. However, it is worth to mention that, the use of long-term credentials,
even if combined with a pseudonym approach, opens up the possibility of linking
a pseudonym with the vehicle’s real identifier (e.g. an attacker overhearing the
communications for a long period in parking lot). The analysis of the efective-
ness of pseudonym change provided by (Beresford et al., 2003), defining mix-zones
to provide privacy in pervasive computing, has been exploited by different au-
thors. In (Dötzer, 2005) the concept of short-term certificates with centrally
assigned pseudonyms for VANETs was proposed. Authors define a system where
vehicles change pseudonyms in a certain region pointed out by the system, the




region is defined when a large number of vehicles are within the communica-
tion range, a disadvantage appears when there are not enough vehicles changing
pseudonyms within the region. In (Golle et al., 2004) authors propose self as-
signed digital pseudonyms, taking a set of measures while changing them: (i)
synchronizing pseudonym change, (ii) introducing gaps (silent periods) and (iii)
changing pseudonyms when nodes are in the region (this was also considered
in (Gerlach, 2006), by defining them as mix-contexts in addition to frequently
change of pseudonyms and protection of a centralized mapping that intend to
increase anonymity). CARAVAN (Sampigethaya et al., 2005), also proposes a
random silent period in order to hamper linkability between pseudonyms. An
improvement of mix-contexts was presented by (Gerlach & Güttler, 2007), con-
sidering anonymity over randomly changing pseudonyms in certain intervals. In
Choi et al. (2005) authors proposed a system to balance auditability and privacy
in VANETs based on symmetric cryptographic primitives and two different sorts
of pseudonyms (short and long term). A study of practicability in pseudonymity
deployment and implementation is done in (Fonseca et al., 2007), where possible
solutions are represented as a combination of existing pseudonymity algorithms.
Authors of (Liao & Li, 2009) proposed the synchronous pseudonym change al-
gorithm where vehicular status information was taken into consideration and
claimed to be more effective than those based on the mix-zones concept. How-
ever, even though pseudonym-based approaches are a commonly accepted solution
to protect privacy in VANETs there are still open issues to be solved. Certificate
revocation has then been identified as one of these important issues, mainly due
to i) the large number of certificates to be issued for a single vehicle, and ii) the
need of ”fresh” revocation information, which has led to the need of implementing
additional mechanisms.
3.3 Certificate Revocation
In common PKI approaches certificate revocation is assumed to be done with
the distribution of CRLs which contain the most recently revoked certificates.
However, CRLs can be very long due to the increased number of vehicles and
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their high mobility, even short lifetime of certificates still creates a vulnerability
window.
Authors of (Fischer et al., 2006) proposed the SRAAC protocol which al-
lows distribution of certificates, anonymous message authentication with quorum
based blinded certificate issuance, anonymity, revocation and isolation of mis-
behaving vehicles. The protocol introduces a set of intermediate certification
servers, previously certified by a CA. Making use of a digital signature algorithm
called Magic Ink-DSS with shared secrets mainly provide revocable anonymity,
where more than one entity must agree to be able to revoke anonymity. The main
drawback of the proposed revocation model is that when a vehicle is detected as
malicious, it cannot be immediately isolated because of the number of certificates
previously stored in its On Board Unit (OBU), which will still be valid for some
arbitrary time. A more complex approach was proposed by authors of (Papadim-
itratos et al., 2008), which consisted of three different protocols: (i) Revocation
using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL), (ii) Revocation of the
Tamper-Proof Device RTPD, and (iii) Distributed Revocation Protocol DRP,
each one adapted to a specific VANET scenario. In the RC2RL and RTPD when
revocation occurs the CA sends a message to the ”revoked vehicle”, however other
relying parties (vehicles and service providers) do not receive this notifications,
which opens a security gap on the whole VANET system. In the case of the
DRP protocol, the possibility of collusion attacks remains open. Obviously the
existence of an attacker detection system is assumed for the deployment of these
protocols, has not yet been designed.
Authors of (Haas et al., 2009) proposed a mechanism based on bloom filters,
and consisting of two main mechanisms, one to reduce the size of the CRLs and
the second one to organize and distribute the updates on the CRLs instead of
the full CRL itself. However, the use of CRLs represents two major problems.
First, is that static lists are difficult to handle, and second is that in distributed
environments involving different CA domains, the management of trust relation-
ships with CRLs could become cumbersome. In ”traditional” PKI environments
OCSP-based protocols have been proven to be a secure alternative to CRLs; how-
ever, in VANETs, this option has been discarded with the common argument that
if communication failures occurred, the OCSP revocation information would be
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hard to manage. Authors of (Papapanagiotou et al., 2007), presented a certifi-
cate validation scheme based on a distributed version of OCSP for authorization
and authentication in VANETs. Their approach focused on distributing cached
OCSP responses, thus avoiding the exchange of extended certificate status lists.
We believe this is an interesting approach that could be complementary to our
contributed solution, to be further discussed in Chapter 4.
3.4 Group Signature
In order to reduce the number of exchanged keys in VANETs, the idea of group
signatures emerged as an alternative to traditional PKI approaches. In a basic
group signature scheme (Chaum & Heyst, 1991) participants are identified as
follows:
• Group Leader: A trusted entity (vehicle or RSU) responsible for managing
the group: initializing and handling joins and leaves (revocations). It is
also responsible for de-anonymizing a signature in case of liability.
• Group Members: Vehicle representing current set of authorized signers.
Each vehicle has a unique private key allowing it to sign on behalf of the
group and a group public key.
Yet, a number of group signature schemes varying in assumptions, complexity
and features have been proposed.
A mechanism for access control in VANET’s network using the Kerberos model
was described in (Moustafa et al., 2006). The authors proposed an authentication
and authorization mechanism to access offered services according to a previous
subscription (token), so afterwards the vehicle is authenticated at the highways
entry points, this model explored a hybrid approach where group signatures where
considered as part of the solution. However, the proposed approach was specific
for highways environments, thus limiting its applicability. Authors of (Guo et al.,
2007) introduced a group signature approach which, combined with role based
access control vehicles were able to sign messages on behalf the group, thus achiev-
ing conditial anonynimity, that could only be reverse by the group leader. The
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main disadvantage of this approach is that, group establishment is handled in
a static way, where vehicles are pre-loaded with the corresponding group keys,
and moreover, when traveling to different domains (geographical regions) vehicles
must have in advanced the keys of all the groups belonging to the correspondiong
hierachical regions. Following a similar idea, authors of (Lin et al., 2007) pre-
sented a group-based approach where vehicles own a group signing keys issued
by a trusted group leader. As an alternative to the aforementioned proposals, a
hybrid approach has been presented by the authors of (Hui et al., 2010). Their
proposal consists of a combination of group-based signatures and identity based
signatures, where the former are used for authentication among private vehicles
and, the latter for public vehicles and RSUs. Nevertheless, the main drawbacks
of group-based approaches include: i) that vehicles must trust a group leader
that is responsible for issuing the corresponding signing keys; ii) due to the speed
and trajectories of vehicles, group members should be considered volatile rather
than permanent and, therefore, using a regular vehicle as a group leader might
compromise the communications availability; iii) a large number of members in
a group could increase the computational complexity, the total number of ex-
changed messages and thus severely impact the overall system performance and
iv) interoperability issues have been considered only in a static form, which is not
sufficient for a highly dynamic environment such as a VANET.
To overcome the trust issues originated due to the group leader being a regular
vehicle, authors of (Xiaoping & Jia, 2012) present a new group-based certificate
solution. The main difference among other group-based solutions is that in the
latter, the group certificates are issued by the RSU’s, which are assumed be
trusted by following a top authority approach (however, note that RSUs are also
considered vulnerable to different security attacks, and, therefore, can not be
completely trusted).
3.5 Identity-based Cryptography
Non-PKI approaches have mostly focused in identity-based cryptography. The
concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by (Boneh & Franklin,
2003) to ease the deployment of the PKI by simplifying the management of a
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large number of public keys. However, it is important to mention that it is based
on an underlying public key cryptosystem and the issuance and utilization pro-
cesses are very similar to those used in a traditional PKI domain. In VANETs,
this idea was first adopted by authors of (Lin et al., 2007), who proposed an ap-
proach based on group-based signatures (as discussed above), and this idea was
followed by authors of (Mahmoud Al-Qutayri, 2010). However, their approach
although interesting, lacks many implementation details, specifically on the cer-
tificate revocation process. Moreover, neither the interoperability issues among
different domains nor the impact on performance are discussed.
3.6 Open Issues
Up to now, research proposals have envisioned a wide range of certification au-
thorities (CAs) acting as trusted third parties within regional scopes, which in
turn, result in the implementation of inter-domain authentication protocols and
the establishment of trust issues among them (e.g. a German vehicle requesting
services in a French infrastructure). However, the security implications derived
from the VANETs’ inter-PKI authentication process i.e. interoperability issues,
have been mostly overlooked by the aforementioned research works by assuming
explicit cross-certification agreements, which, in turn, are based on a static ap-
proach and have been proven to be hard to manage. In order to provide VANET
interoperability among untrusted PKI domains, a PKI-based authentication pro-
tocol capable of dynamically establishing trust relationships among unknown do-
mains is proposed and will be introduced in Chapter 4. Moreover, research pro-
posals aiming to improve privacy, mainly focus on the use of pseudonyms, and
algorithms for changing them in a more efficient form, however pseudonyms can-
not prevent the automatic collection of information allowing an attacker to keep
track of users and vehicles actions (e.g. behavior, movements, preferences, char-
acteristics, etc.). Nevertheless, because of the common belief that pseudonyms
are important for VANETs’ overall security and are quite beneficial for protect-
ing users’ identity, a privacy compliant solution should be fully compatible with
pseudonymity, a privacy-aware protocol based on attribute credentials will be
introduced in Chapter 5. Finally, emerging schemes such as group signature,
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although interesting, must deal with a set of open issues mostly associated to ef-





In a traditional non-VANET Public Key Infrastructure (Housley et al., 1999), to
validate and trust in an entity’s certificate for Authentication and Authorization
purposes, there should be a certificate path pointing to a trust anchor (root of
trust of a certificate). However, in a VANET system, these anchors will change
with the vehicle’s location, as a result, this trust information needs to be propa-
gated as soon as a driver joins a new geographical position, e.g. when traveling
from Germany to France. Once the driver crosses the border, new authoritative
PKI information should be sent just as shown in Figure 4.1. This chapter intro-
duces the concepts of basic and extended path validation, towards proposing an
security model, which specifically addresses the interoperability and revocation
challenges derived from v2v and v2i communication scenarios, in particular, when
a vehicle from a unknown domain is involved in the communication.
4.1 Introduction
Authentication protocols based on Public Key Infrastructure technologies (PKI )
have proved useful for VANETs, mostly thanks to the several security features
that these solutions offer. Take, for example, the use of encryption to query a
VANET’s service provider while avoiding eavesdropping. Also, the use of PKI
and digital certificates enable the use of digital signatures, in order to provide
more guarantees to, for example, exchange emergency messages among vehicles
in the case of road accidents. Unfortunately, the sole implementation of PKI on
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Figure 4.1: Geolocation-based Trust
a highly distributed environment such as in VANETs, comes with a important
challenges:
• Lack of real-time revocation: considering the current version of the ITU-T
X509.v3 standard (Housley et al., 2002) only considers the use of Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs). As it has been previously analyzed (Chapter
3), real-time information exchange is an important issue and the common
CRL-based solution might not be appropriate to VANET environments,
where in many cases, the different entities require “fresh” (updated) status
information about the drivers’ and vehicles’ digital certificates. Moreover,
alternative solutions such as OCSP also represent interesting challenges
for VANET scenarios and must be carefully addressed, in particular with
communication failures.
• Interoperability: as mentioned in Chapter 2, the use of several Certification
Authorities (CAs) in VANETs conveys several interoperability challenges.
The big question here is: how to assess the “trust level” of a CA, in order
to decide if it is “trusted enough”?
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• Privacy: Common PKI approaches are based on long-term certificates as-
sociated to a digital identity. Since PKI was not intended to overcome any
privacy issues, thus personal information contained in certificates might not
be properly used by third parties.
To provide interoperability among untrusted domains, existing approaches
based their solution on static certificates and trust relationships among partici-
pants (Section 2.2), resulting in additional security considerations e.g. vehicles
needing to access up-to-date CA’s information in order to accurately validate mes-
sages received on the road. Analyzing the previous example of a German vehicle
traveling to a different domain -France (Figure 4.1). While the German vehicle
owns a certificate issued by the German CA, vehicles and the infrastructure in
France will communicate with messages digitally signed by certificates issued by
the French CA. Authentication among the involved vehicles and the infrastructure
implies a certificate validation process that will include i) cryptographic verifi-
cations over the certificate path, ii) certificate’s validity period verification, iii)
certificate status verification, and iv) first certificate in chain verification. Based
on this example, the main interoperability issue is how can the validation pro-
cess be performed if the trust anchor cannot be determined?. Let us
remember that the German CA is unknown to the French VANET infrastructure
and vice versa. Also another question rises due to this trust issue: how will
the involved parties validate the revocation information?. Next section
introduces important concepts to provide a better understanding of the proposed
model (further discussed in Section 4.4).
4.2 Concepts
To achieve validation and interoperability among untrusted VANETs PKI do-
mains the proposed Inter-domain Authentication System for VANETs (further
discussed in Section 4.5) is based on the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) standard (Myers et al., 1999) which is by no means new, and has been
successfully implemented in other distributed environments (Casola et al., 2007c).
In this section the basic concepts behind the proposed approach are introduced.
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4.2.1 Basic Path Validation
According to the x.509 v3 standard (Housley et al., 2002), the Basic Path Valida-
tion is the process that determines if a digital certificate is “trusted”, according
to the following criteria: i) the verifier has to verify the digital signature, ii)
the information within the certificate (expiration date, certificate version, etc),
iii) the suspension/revocation status and iv) the validity of all certificates in the
certification path until a trust anchor. It is easy to observe that the ”basic path
validation” process does not include any check to assess the trust level of the
issuing CA, and even more importantly, does not perform any real-time lookup
on the certificate’s status, thus opening a vulnerability window for the whole
system. To complete the Basic Path Validation process, our proposal introduces
the notion of near-real time validation via the Online Certificate Status Protocol
OCSP (Myers et al., 1999).
4.2.2 Multi-CA OCSP
OCSP, was created to be used instead of or as in most cases- in conjunction with
other mechanisms like local Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL), to provide timely
information regarding the revocation status of a digital certificate. Even though
it was initially designed for applications carrying highly sensitive and valuable
information, nowadays it is being used in a wide variety of systems.
When deploying a PKI, certificate validation using OCSP may be preferred
over the use of CRLs for several reasons:
• OCSP can provide more timely information regarding the revocation status
of a certificate.
• OCSP removes the need for clients to retrieve the (sometimes very large)
CRLs themselves, leading to less network traffic and better bandwidth man-
agement.
• To a degree, OCSP supports trusted chaining of OCSP Requests between
Responders. This allows clients to communicate with a trusted Responder
to query an alternate Responder, saving client-side complexity.
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OCSP is based on a request-response scheme, in which an OCSP Client issues
a certificate status query to an OCSP Responder which includes the following
data:
• Target certificate identifier, consisting of an unordered list of certificate
identifiers formed with the issuer’s distinguish name hash, issuer’s public
key hash and finally the serial number of the certificate whose status is
being requested.
• Optional extensions which may be processed by the OCSP Responder; for
example, to demand information about the Certificate Authority quality.
The OCSP request itself may be secured if the client uses a nonce (protec-
tion against replay attacks) and digitally signs it. Once received by the OCSP
Responder, this request is verified (i.e. digital signature), processed and a defini-
tive response message is produced. For each one of the certificates in an OCSP
Request, the OCSP Response message will contain any of the following status:
Good, Revoked (either permanently or temporarily) and Unknown. The signing
key of the OCSP Responder is a very sensitive issue in a PKI environment and, in
fact, depending on the certificate being used to sign the responses, we can define
three different operation modes:
• Authorized OCSP Responder mode
• Transponder OCSP Responder mode
• Trusted OCSP Responder mode
For the proposal presented in this chapter, the “Trusted mode” in Figure 4.2 will
be used to centrally provide a single OCSP service connected to several VANETs’
PKI hierarchies. In Figure 4.2 it can be observed that the OCSP signing certificate
(subject T ) belongs to a hierarchy that differs from that of the certificates being
requested (neither of A, Y or W ). For example, the OCSP service has to be
explicitly trusted by the user with subject X -. In practice, OCSP Responders
working under such centralized models, implement a response cache (the “OCSP
cache” from Figure 4.2) to increase their performance while reducing the number
of queries to external Authorized OCSP Responders and other revocation sources





































Figure 4.2: OSCP in trusted mode
4.2.3 Extended Path Validation
The methodology used to evaluate the security level provided by a Certification
Authority and decide to create a dynamic trust relationship with it, is the Refer-
ence Evaluation Model (REM) (Casola et al., 2007b). Its main goal is to provide
an automatic mean to state the security level provided by an infrastructure; REM
has been widely adopted in the past to dynamically build CA Federations.
4.2.3.1 CA Federation
In a CA Federation the members agree on a minimum set of security requirements
that must be fulfilled by all of them to interoperate. These minimum requirements
are usually a subset of the CA’s Certificate Policy (CP) and can be audited at
any time by the other members of the same Federation. If a new CA wants to
participate in the Federation, then its CP must pass through an “accreditation”
process to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements or, in other case,
to assess the candidate in which provisions (individual rules from the CP) should
be improved to become a member. Once the accreditation process has been
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passed the new member CA’s root certificate is added to a trusted repository
(usually hosted by the Federation itself). Instead of distributing new sets of
cross-certificates to all the VANET’s nodes it is only necessary to let them know
how to access the CA Federation’s repository in order to update their local copies
of trusted CAs.
4.2.3.2 Reference Evaluation Model
The methodology REM basically defines i) how to express in a rigorous way a
security policy (a Certification Policy in our particular case), ii) how to evaluate
a formalized policy and, iii) how to state the provided security level. With REM
any policy is represented through an XML tree containing all its provisions as
intermediate nodes and leaves.
1. The Structuring phase associates an enumerative and ordered data type
Ki to the n leave-provisions of the policy. A policy space “P” is defined as P
= K1 × K2 × ... × Kn, i.e. the vectorial product of the n provisionsKi. For
example, the provision KeyLenght can assume the following ordered values:
{128bits, 512bits, 1024bits, 2048bits}. The space is defined according to a
policy template that strongly depends on the application context.
2. The Formalization phase turns the policy space “P” into an homogeneous
space “PS”. This transformation is accomplished by a normalization and
clusterization process which allows to associate a Local Security Level (LSL)
to each provision. For example if a policy has a KeyLenght of 512bits, it
will be associated to the LSL = 2 and the normalized vector is (1, 1, 0, 0).
After that the provisions may be compared by comparing their LSLs.
3. The Evaluation phase pre-processes the “PS” vector of LSLs in order to
represent it by a n× 4 matrix whose rows are the single provisions Ki and
the number of columns is the chosen number of LSLs for each provision. For
example, if the number of LSL is four and the LSL associated to a provision
is l2, the row in the matrix associated to the provision in the matrix will be:
(1, 1, 0, 0). Finally, a distance criteria for the definition of a metric space is
applied. REM adopts the Euclidean distance among matrices:
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where σ(A−B,A−B) = Trace ((A−B)(B − A)T )
In summary, REM’s goal is to evaluate the GSL or security level associated with
a CA through the evaluation of its Certificate Policy so trust decisions can be
taken. To better illustrate our proposal and how the aforementioned concepts
can be effectively adopted by VANETs the two basic communication scenarios
will be presented, mainly consisting of the interactions performed in v2v and v2i
communications.
4.3 Authentication Requirements in VANETs
Communications
Following the communication model presented in Chapter 2, this section analyzes
different scenarios where authentication is required and how should be achieved,
in particular highlights the challenges that are present in typical situations of the
v2v and v2i communication.
4.3.1 Vehicle to Vehicle Authentication
This scenario includes v2v communication without infrastructure availability,
considering that, in a VANET environment vehicles need to authenticate each
other in different situations that are classified according to the following:
• A vehicle offering a “service” is a good example in terms of information
sharing (personal o related to a particular service). Before granting any
kind of permission the vehicle offering the service needs to validate the
requestor’s vehicle credentials.
• A vehicle receives a message from other vehicle (e.g. a safety related mes-
sage), and therefore needs to “prove” the message’s legitimacy by validating
the sender’s credential.
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Both situations require a local authentication service able to address two main
issues: i) how to provide local authentication if the infrastructure is unavailable?,
and ii) how to deal with a situation where vehicles belong to different domains?
4.3.2 Vehicle to Infrastructure Authentication
This scenario involves vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, where vehicles
communicate with the RSUs available on the roads. The infrastructure is able
of providing different kinds of information that are strictly dependent on the
vehicle’s requests and geolocation, and that can be classified into the following
situations:
• A vehicle needs to access a location-based service or any other service of-
fered by a Service Provider (SP). Before granting access and providing the
requested information the SP must validate the vehicle’s credentials.
• A vehicle receives a message from the infrastructure (e.g. a safety related
message, service response), and therefore needs to “prove” the message’s
legitimacy by validating the sender’s credential.
• In a v2v communication where vehicles need to authenticate each other, and
in the case of infrastructure availability then the vehicles request trusted
information from the infrastructure in order to mutually validate their cre-
dentials.
All situations include the use of authentication services, which are actually
provided by the infrastructure and that must deal with the issue of interoperabil-
ity among different CAs. The main security issues to be addressed in this scenario
are: i) how can a vehicle implement interoperable and secure authentication in
VANETs?, ii) how to allow vehicles in a VANET to perform authentication un-
der different (untrusted) domains?, and iii) how to deal with the communication
failures that are inherent to the VANETs system?
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Figure 4.3: Security Architectural Model
4.4 Security Model for VANETs’ Communica-
tion
The security analysis of the aforementioned scenarios lead us to model the VANET
as two different networks: an ad hoc network of vehicles comprised of unreliable
and dynamic connections (v2v), and a fixed network’s infrastructure offering dif-
ferent services to vehicles (v2i). The v2i scenario models the communication
between these two networks, while the v2v scenario represents an ad hoc com-
munication. To face the issues presented by the previous scenarios, the VANET
protocol should implement optimized messages where security (e.g. digital sig-
nature mechanism and cryptosystem being used) and performance (e.g. signa-
ture size and encryption time) are balanced. The security model proposed takes
into account the overall VANET’s security and performance requirements inde-
pendently from the (proprietary) involved technology. At the design level, the
security architectural model can be represented as in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3 depicts the main components of the proposed security model and
shows that a VANET can be simply modeled as a distributed system composed
by i) wireless communications among vehicles and RSUs, and ii) fixed commu-
nications among the RSUs, the Authentication System (AS), and a set of SPs
hosting VANET’s services. Note that vehicles belonging to different domains
also own certificates issued by different CAs. The creation of several PKIs each
one installing its own CA and thus giving birth to a large set of different and
untrusted security domains, represents one of the biggest interoperability and
security problems that could arise among all VANET users.
The security model proposed in this thesis faces this problem with the adop-
tion of an Authentication System, that acts as an intermediary between the cer-
tificate verifiers (vehicles and service providers) and the issuing CAs by means of
two validation mechanisms (namely basic and extended path validation)(Sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.3, respectively). The details of the proposed Authentication System
will be further discussed in Section 4.5. On the other hand, the proposed model
also faces the problems originated due to the inherent connectivity failures by
associating a Personal Agent (PA) to each vehicle’s request. The PA acts on
behalf of the vehicle that generated a service request by means of a delegation
model: the vehicle’s PA activates and interacts with the Authentication System
in the “wired” network, while keeping the vehicle’s session status. In other words,
when a vehicle needs to deal with connection failures (e.g. if for any reason loses
connection before receiving the requested information from the infrastructure),
then its associated PA will be capable of maintaining the last connection status.
As soon as the vehicle reconnects to the infrastructure, its PA will send the cor-
responding request result. Further details on the different protocols used in the
proposed security model will be discussed in Section 4.6.
4.5 Inter-domain Authentication System
In order to contribute to a solution for the aforementioned scenarios (Section
4.3), and taking into account the unique features of a VANET, the authentication
system proposed in Section 4.4 contains a set of basic functionalities that allow:
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1. The use of near real-time revocation information for multi-CA VANET
environments, based on the OCSP protocol.
2. The use of a security metric able to compute the “security level” associated
with a digital certificate, also in near-real time, in order to decide if the
VANET nodes should trust it or not.
The main goal of the Authentication System (AS) is to enable the basic and
extended path validation of digital certificates. According to the x.509 v3 stan-
dard, the validation of a digital certificate issued by any CA, may consist of two
different set of operations:
1. if the CA is trusted, the verifier has to verify the digital signature, the in-
formation within the certificate (expiration date, certificate version, etc),
the suspension/revocation status, the validity of all certificates in the certi-
fication path until a trust Anchor — basic path validation — Section 4.2.1
2. if the CA is not trusted, the verifier has to perform the same actions as
in point (1) and additionally has to evaluate if a trust relationship can be
created with the otherwise untrusted CA. This action can be performed in
a static or dynamic way — extended path validation — Section 4.2.3
While the first point is widely adopted in the literature and implemented in
many available applications, the second point is more delicate. At the state of
the art, only static extended path validation is performed and implemented in
real world applications. It is primarily based on extending trust links to an un-
trusted CA by explicit human-based agreements that result in cross-certification
processes and, the issuance of cross-certificates that the relying party can use
as Trust-Anchors. Nevertheless, the techniques to dynamically extend trust are
promising and some scientific works have appeared in the literature (Casola et al.,
2007c) to adopt innovative CA evaluation metrics towards this goal. To perform
validation operations (both basic and extended), the proposed Authentication
System is made of two main components: a Certificate Validator and a Trust-
ing CA component, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The Certificate Validator is
in charge of providing near-real time certificate’s status information; while the
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Figure 4.4: Authentication System Components
Trusting CA component establishes a trust level across unknown domains. In the
following subsections, the main details of these two components will be described.
4.5.1 Certificate Validator
This module is in charge of improving the so-called Basic Path Validation process
(introduced in Section 4.2.1) via the use of near real-time certificate validation.
The primary goal of a Basic Path Validation process is to verify the binding
between a subject’s distinguished name or a subject’s alternative name and the
subject’s public key -as represented in the end entity certificate-, based on the
public key of the trust anchor (i.e. a Certification Authority). This process re-
quires obtaining a sequence of certificates that support that binding. To meet this
goal, the path validation process verifies, among other things, that a prospective
certification path (a sequence of n certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
• For all x in {1, ..., n−1}, the subject of certificate x is the issuer of certificate
x+ 1;
• certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor;
• certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and
• for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time in question.
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As mentioned before, the Certificate Validator by itself cannot decide the trust
level of the issuing CA or the real-time revocation status of the digital certificate
under evaluation. These are the reasons why the “Trusting CA” subsystem is
proposed and will be introduced next.
4.5.2 Trusting CA
The Trusting CA component aims to evaluate the trust level associated with
each one of the participating CAs via two different approaches: the static trust
evaluation and the dynamic trust evaluation.
The static approach is based on off-line agreements between the CAs par-
ticipating in a VANET environment. Usually these are bi-lateral agreements,
meaning that if CA1 trusts in CA2, then the opposite is also true. Static trust’s
agreements are built using lists of trusted CAs or cross-certification processes. It
is easy to notice that both approaches are cumbersome to maintain, therefore our
proposal of using the dynamic trust evaluation approach, just as presented next.
The dynamic trust evaluation has been proposed in order to overcome the po-
tential disadvantages of the static trust evaluation in ad-hoc environments, like
e.g. VANETs. Taking into account the constantly changing trust relationships
among the CAs in a VANET, the belief is that, it is necessary to use techniques
able to compute “on-the-fly” the trust level associated to each one of them. In or-
der to do this, the Trusting CA subsystem implements two mechanisms. For eval-
uating the CA’s security level and generating the dynamic trust relationship, the
implementation of the Reference Evaluation Methodology REM- (Casola et al.,
2007b) is proposed, whose main goal is to provide an automatic mean to com-
pute the security level of a digital certificate. This methodology has been widely
adopted to dynamically build CA federations (Casola et al., 2007a) and to com-
plete the Basic Path Validation process, the Trusting CA introduces the notion of
near-real time validation, a second core component namely the Online Certificate
Status Protocol OCSP (introduced in Section 4.2.2), which is implemented as
an interface between the Authentication System and the Multi-CA OCSP. OCSP
was created to be used instead of or as in most of the cases- in conjunction with
other mechanisms like local CRLs to provide timely information regarding the
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revocation status of a digital certificate. Section 4.6 will describe the associated
protocols of an interoperability system for VANETs.
4.6 Managing Interoperability Among Untrusted
PKI Domains
The authentication system allows interoperable authentication in any distributed
infrastructure, nonetheless the successful implementation of the AS must deal
with the communication failures that are inherent for the VANET system due to
its dynamic nature (infrastructure-less scenarios and nodes mobility). Consider a
scenario where a vehicle moves from one RSU to another, where RSUs are posi-
tioned with a great distance in between, if the communication between the vehicle
and the RSU is lost then keeping the request status and the secure management
of messages are important challenges. In other words when a vehicle reaches the
communication range from the second RSU, this new RSU must be able to pro-
vide the requested service. Dealing with communication failures is an important
issue that is addressed by the AS by assuming that the communication among
vehicles and infrastructure (v2i) is asynchronous, and a PA is associated to each
vehicle. Within a VANET system both v2i and v2v scenarios can be represented
by a combination of different parameters and the corresponding authentication
protocol must cope with the particularities introduced by them:
• v2v communication takes place among two vehicles belonging to different
domains. This scenario implies 2 different actions: i) a registration process
(a vehicle asks for a temporary certificate through the infrastructure - AS
and the OCSP responder), ii) a vehicle already owns a temporary certificate
and can implement basic or extended path validation (locally or with the
infrastructure).
• v2i communication takes place among vehicle and a Service Provider (SP),
and the latter is in charge of validating the local or foreign credentials via
the AS.
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• v2v communication takes place among two vehicles belonging to the same
trusted domain and i) there is no infrastructure availability to validate
credentials, therefore the basic path validation (Section 4.2.1) must be im-
plemented or ii) there is infrastructure availability to validate credentials,
so in this case the extended path validation can be implemented (Section
4.2.3).
4.6.1 Extended v2i Communication Protocol
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a vehicle in a VANET will own a certificate issued
by its regional Certification Authority (CA), which allows inter-vehicle or vehicle
to infrastructure authentication. Within a region, credentials will be validated by
simply performing the basic path validation. In order to communicate with vehi-
cles or infrastructure in a different “untrusted” domain (e.g. a different country),
vehicles are required to first perform a registration process in the new domain, so
a new temporary certificate will be issued by the foreign Certification Authority.
The temporary certificate will be validated locally by any other vehicle within
the same domain, even if no infrastructure is available. Note that, if the vehicle
does not own the temporary certificate; in order to be authenticated the extended
path validation must be performed. This process will require a specific set of ser-
vices from the infrastructure just as shown in Figure 4.5, where a combination of
synchronous and asynchronous communication takes place in order to:
1. Authenticate a vehicle to provide infrastructural services
2. Authenticate a vehicle with extended path validation.
An alternative to include the full digital certificate in the proposed protocol
is to use a unique identification for it (let us call it CertID). This is the design
has been decided to follow, because as will be seen in Chapter 7, the use of a
CertID dramatically reduces the size of the exchanged messages. The CertID can
be build via an approach like the one used by RCF 2560 ((Myers et al., 1999)),
and just as shown in Table 4.1
Where:
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Cert id ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, – Hash of Issuer’s DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, – Hash of Issuers public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
Table 4.1: OCSP’s Certificate ID structure in ASN.1
• issuerNameHash is the hash of the Issuer CA’s distinguished name.
• issuerKeyHash is the hash of the Issuer CA’s public key.
• The hash algorithm used for both these hashes, is identified in hashAlgo-
rithm.
• And serialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle’s certificate for which
the status is being requested.
As shown in Figure 4.5, for the implementation of the asynchronous protocol
the proposed approach is based on a set of PAs that are able to store a session’s
requests in order to maintain its state - especially when connections are lost -.
Figure 4.5, also shows that the RSU receives a vehicle’s signed requests towards
a specific service (e.g. registration, validation or any other service offered by the
infrastructure). The RSU’s server creates a PA and associates the corresponding
request to it. Afterwards the identification of the Personal Agent (PAID) is
sent to the vehicle as an acknowledgement. In turn, the PA acts on behalf the
vehicle within the infrastructure in order to complete the authentication process
through performing the extended path validation and forwarding the vehicle’s
request to the SP after successful authentication. Finally the PA will store the
results of the original request, to be forwarded to the requestor (vehicle), even
if the connection was lost. In subsequent messages, vehicles will include their
PAID, which can be verified by the VANET infrastructure in order to return the
previously stored results. Note that the proposed protocol was designed taking
into consideration the connection constraints of a VANET (only a few messages
must be exchanged), and by adopting an asynchronous approach (messages being
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Figure 4.5: v2i Communication Protocol
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exchanged are short and do not require any complex behavior). In fact, it is
the Personal Agent residing on the RSU server and communicating with other
components within the VANET’s fixed network, the one in charge of managing the
complex elaborations. Thus in this case, security is granted due to the certificate
delegation model between the vehicle and the PA. By following the asynchronous
approach just described, if the client sends a request before the result is available,
then the server will then return a “Null” message.
4.6.2 Extended v2v Communication Protocol
This protocol is aimed at providing local certificate validation (basic path valida-
tion) in v2v communications. The underlying mechanisms have been specifically
designed to deal with the infrastructure unavailability. Just as depicted in Fig-
ure 4.6 when vehicle1 requests information, it sends a signed message to vehicle2,
which in turn generates a reqid that is sent back as an acknowledgement. In order
to perform the basic path validation without infrastructure availability, vehicle2
must have stored “cached” the Public key of the issuing CA. Additionally, in or-
der to enforce the local certificate validation, our proposal assumes that vehicles
will also be capable of storing a list of previously validated certificate identifiers
(validated through the infrastructure). This list will be stored for a temporary
period of time t, thus enabling vehicles to determine whether certain credentials
were successfully validated before, similar to CRL distributions mechanisms dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, this approach also supports distribution of cached OCSP
responses. Going back to 4.6 vehicle2 will then locally validate credentials of
vehicle1, and as in the previous protocol for subsequent messages of the session,
vehicle1 will attach the reqid in order to gather the requested information from
vehicle2.
Note that in infrastructure-less scenarios, even with the use of the list of
previously validated credentials and OCSP cached responses, there will exist a
vulnerability window that cannot be prevented (e.g. certificates that have been
recently revoked will still appear to be valid), however other mechanisms can
be used to reduce this risk such as local validation of messages according to
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Figure 4.6: v2v without infrastructure - basic path validation
its classification. Let us take for example the setting of different priority levels
according to the message types (e.g. warning message priority level 1, weather
conditions priority level 2, etc), by assigning “trust” levels referencing the type
of vehicle in the VANET (e.g. ambulance trust level 1, police car trust level
2, etc). With the combination of these two strategies, the aforementioned risk
could be severely reduced. The exploration of these additional strategies will be
further discussed in Chapter 6.
4.6.3 Enabling Vehicular Communication in Untrusted Do-
mains
To enable communication among untrusted domains, a vehicle (vehicle1) with
a certificate issued by its local CA (CertCA1) must first perform a registration
process in order to gather a temporary certificate from the foreign CA (CA2).
This registration process can be defined as follows.
1. A vehicle entering a new domain authenticates to the infrastructure via a
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Figure 4.7: v2v with infrastructure availability - extended path validation
RSU (this implies v2i communication just as described in Section 4.6.1 and
Figure 4.5).
2. The RSU requests to the local CA authority the issuing of a temporary
certificate
3. The CA authority validates the current certificate, extends trust, registers
the user in its directories and issues the new temporary certificate that is
delivered to the vehicle via the RSU.
Once the registration process has been successful; a vehicle can authenticate
another vehicle in both basic and extended modes. In particular if the infras-
tructure is not available, then the protocol described in Section 4.6.2 and Figure
4.6 must be performed. If the infrastructure is available then the extended path
validation is possible, just as shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 represents the communication flow involving the following scenar-
ios:
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1. v2v communication between two vehicles belonging to untrusted domains:
this scenario might involve a previous registration process where the foreign
vehicle will own a temporary certificate issued by the local CA, and this
registration process will simplify further validation interactions. Within
this process the infrastructure will perform validation and authentication
process via the OCSP responder in order to gather certificate information
from the issuing CA. Note that without the registration process and con-
sidering infrastructure availability it is still possible to perform the same
validation process via OCSP, however the main advantage of the tempo-
rary certificate is to reduce the number of executions of the whole process
and ease the interactions among vehicles when no infrastructure is available
(local validation of certificates issued by the same CA).
2. v2v communication belonging to the same domain: considering the infras-
tructure availability this scenario will involve the implementation of the
extended path validation for certificates issued by the same CA.
The interactions in the v2v communications are shown in Figure 4.7 and explained
next. First, vehicle1 sends a message to vehicle2; this message will include its
own certificate identifier (CertID1). Then, vehicle2 replies with a reqID as an
acknowledgment to vehicle1’s request. Afterwards, in order to perform the ex-
tended path validation, vehicle2 sends to the infrastructure (via RSU) a message
including both certificate identifiers (CertID1 and CertID2). Just as described in
the v2i protocol (Figure 4.5), the RSU generates a PA associated to vehicle2’s
request and sends the PAID as an acknowledgement. The PA acts on behalf
vehicle2 and performs all actions described in the v2i protocol. The PA stores
the result that will be consulted by vehicle2 within subsequent messages in the
session. To validate whether the messages belong to previously established ses-
sion the PAID must be included. Once vehicle2 has the validation result from
the infrastructure is then able to provide the results to vehicle1 in subsequent




In this chapter an authentication system able to provide authentication among
vehicles belonging to a different domain has been proposed, the AS is based on
two main components, a OCSP based component that provided online status
verification of a given certificate and a REM based component to build dynamic
CA federations and establish dynamic trust relationships, since the introduced
concepts rely on the infrastructure availability, a PA was also introduced to deal
with the communication failures that are inherent to a VANET system. Nev-
ertheless, two main open issues could be identified, i) the propose AS does not
provide any privacy protection and ii) in scenario where the infrastructure is not
available at all the local validation of certificate implies a security vulnerability
window. To address the aforementioned privacy issues, the following Chapter in-
troduces a privacy enhancing protocol based on the implementation of attribute
credentials which in turn could be implemented on the PKI-OCSP based solution
just described, finally the to be able to reduce the security vulnerability window




Enhancing Privacy in Vehicular
Communications
This chapter presents a Privacy Enhancing Model which introduces the concept
of Attribute Based Credentials (ABCs) to provide conditional anonymity. An
overview of important concepts regarding ABCs will be introduced, followed by
the description of the Attribute-Based Privacy model and its main architectural
components. Additionally, the Anonymous Information Retrieval (AIR) privacy
protocol based on query permutation and forgery aimed at alleviating user pro-
filing in v2i communications will be described.
5.1 Attribute-Based Privacy
In typical PKI approaches, the use of certificates leads to unnecessarily revealing
the identity of its holder, moreover, as previously discussed, PKI does not guaran-
tee any privacy protection. In VANETs communications, when a driver or vehicle
requests information to any other entity, the corresponding entity only needs to
verify if the vehicle is authorized to access the requested resource or service, and
does not necessarily needs to learn the corresponding identity. Revealing more
information than necessary could lead to potential privacy risks. An attacker
hearing the communications might be able to trace and link communications and
transactions of each vehicle, in particular, in those scenarios where there are not
enough vehicles communicating. The passive collection of information will enable
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the attacker to keep track of driver’s/vehicle’s actions (e.g. behavior, movements,
preferences, characteristics, etc.).
To overcome the aforementioned privacy issues, next section introduces basic
concepts of Privacy Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABCs) towards proposing
an Attribute-Based Privacy (ABP) protocol for VANETs, that will effectively
implement P-ABCs specifically to provide conditional anonymity and minimal
information disclosure.
5.1.1 Privacy Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABCs)
P-ABCs, are basically a PKI with privacy enhancing features. P-ABCs are issued
just like ordinary cryptographic credentials (e.g. X.509 credentials) using a digital
(secret) signature key (Camenisch et al., 2012).
However, the main enhancing feature in P-ABCs, is that, credential’s at-
tributes could be transformed into ‘unlinkable’ presentation tokens able to protect
the holder’s privacy, and verifiable in a similar form, just like cryptographic cre-
dentials (using the public verification key of the issuer), and that offer the same
strong security. Next section will introduce the main components in P-ABCs.
5.1.1.1 Components
This section describes the different entities involved in P-ABCs and how do they
interact with each other.
User in P-ABCs the user is the entity to which the credentials are issued, and
responsible for managing and selecting from which credential, which at-
tributes will be disclosed and to which entities.
Attribute Authority (AA) the AA is responsible for issuing credentials.
Verifier the verifier is an entity willing to protect access to a resource or service,




Revocation Authority (RA) the RA is responsible for revoking issued cre-
dentials, in a form that these credentials will not be able to generate pre-
sentation tokens.
Inspector a trusted authority able to de-anonymize presentation tokens under
specific circumstances.
5.1.1.2 Features
This section presents a high level description of the main functionalities offered
by the P-ABCs. A more technical explanation can be found in (Camenisch et al.,
2012).
Credential issuance At initial stage, the AA generates public issuer parameters
and a secret issuance key (similar to public key). The issuer parameters are
used by verifiers to verify the authenticity of presentation tokens, and to
create presentation tokens
Token generation The presentation token is derived from one or more creden-
tials
Token presentation Tokens are sent to verifiers to provide certified information
to from any number of credentials. The token can reveal a subset of the
attribute values in the credentials or prove that one or more values satisfy
a certain predicate. Presentation tokens support the use of pseudonyms.
Presentation Policy The presentation policies are published by the verifiers,
and determine the conditions the must be met to access a resources or ser-
vice, which credentials/issuers does the verifier trust, and which information
should the token reveal or prove.
Token inspection Token inspection is a form to somehow reverse anonymity,
conditional anonymity is provided only if token were generated in compliant
with a presentation policy that specifies the information that should be
recoverable by an inspector.
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De-anonymization Is the result from the token inspection, typical example is
related to liability, however, other scenarios include that for certain service,
the SP might rely in a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for example for payments,
the SP will publish in the presentation policy which information should be
encrypted using the TTP public key.
5.1.2 Attribute-Based Privacy (ABP) Protocol
In VANETs the implementation of a VPKI with hierachical certification authori-
ties is envisioned. In Chapter 4, an AS able to provide PKI-based authentication
among untrusted domains was introduced. However, although the proposed ap-
proach copes with interesting challenges, privacy issues remain unsolved. Thus
additional mechanisms to support conditional privacy must be considered as an
integration of the underlying solution. This section describes the proposed PKI-
compliant ABP protocol, which inspired by P-ABCs implements conditional pri-
vacy, specifically to address vehicle’s tracking (big brother scenario). Next section
describes the main component of the ABP.
5.1.2.1 Entity’s Definition
In compliance with the VPKI and P-ABCs, as shown in Figure 5.1, the ABP
defines three different types of entities the will be introduced next.
Attribute Authority (AA) the AA is the authority responsible for issuing and
revoking the corresponding attribute credentials. In VANET scenarios the
AA could be represented by the regional CA or by any trusted authority
in charge of issuing, revoking, and when applicable revealing the attribute-
based credentials. Note that ABCs are different than the short-term cre-
dentials issued by the AS.
Vehicle/Driver in ABP, entities to which the AA will issue the ABCs, will be
mainly represented by vehicles and drivers. This entities will be responsible
for managing and selecting from which credentials, which attributes will
be disclosed and to which entities, and ultimately will be responsible for

















Figure 5.1: ABP protocol involved entities
Service Provider (SP) The SP consists of any relying party willing to protect
access to resources, information or services, in common VANET scenarios
the SP could be represented by RSUs, vehicles, authorities, or services pro-
vided by the infrastructure. In VANETs SPs will define the attributes and
conditions that should be included in the presentation tokens for vehicles
and drivers to prove, and, the access to be granted.
The implementation of the ABPs in VANET relies on the existence of the PKI-
based AS. That is, since ABP strongly depends on the AS, it is very likely that the
AA will actually be represented by the same CA responsible for issuing certificates
in VANET. The process to obtain the attribute credentials will be described next.
5.1.2.2 Credentials Issuance
By implementing the AS, the credential issuance process assumes that a vehicle
in a VANET posses a certificate issued by a trusted CA. At initial stage, upon
request, the vehicle will provide either the CertID or the full certificate to AA.
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The AA will perform the basic or extended path validation process to verify that
credentials have not been revoked. The provided certificate could also consist of a
short-term certificate based on an underlying pseudonym solution. On successful
validation, the AA will then issue to the vehicle the corresponding ABCs. ABCs
will include encoded certificate’s information, such as, the expiration date, the
CertID, revocation information, etc. Additional information needed to generate
presentation tokens will also be included.
5.1.2.3 Presentation Tokens
Tokens are data artifacts that contain the required information, and the support
cryptographic evidence, which are exchanged between the vehicles and the service
providers. A token is generated from the vehicle’s /driver’s P-ABCs, and in ABP
are assumed to be pseudonym-based and therefore unlinkable (a SP cannot tell
if two different tokens were derived from the same credentials), unless the token
has been intentionally generated to reveal linkable information (e.g. in case of
liability) the AA could trace back the underlying credentials. In general, a token
will be generated specifically to meet the corresponding SP’s conditions in order
to grant service access. As a result, when a token has been generated, it will be
attached to the vehicle’s request. On reception, the SP will perform two different
actions, i) the token-certificate related validation through the AS, and, if positive,
ii) the ABC validation of the token.
5.1.2.4 Credentials Revocation
In ABP, the revocation of credentials will be done by the AS, providing near-real
time certificate validation via the multi-CA OCSP component. In addition, since
certificates issued by the AS are short-term, the related P-ABCs will be regularly
updated, in particular the non-revocation evidence attribute.
5.1.2.5 Providing Minimal Information Disclosure
This section presents the communication flow of the ABP, and how the mini-
mal information disclosure could be achieved in an inter-regional scenario, next
credential issuance will be described.
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1. A vehicle, vehicle1 with a certificate issued by the CA1, travels to a different
domain infrastructure.
2. Once crossing the inter-regional border, vehicle1 requests a set of P-ABCs
to the current infrastructure, by providing its certificate issued by the CA1.
3. The infrastructure which belongs to a domain with a CA, CA2, since CA1
is unknown, the infrastructure performs the extended path validation in-
troduced in Section 4.2.3.
4. If the certificate of vehicle1 is valid, the CA2 will then issue a set of tem-
porary P-ABCs, so the vehicle will be able to interact with the current
infrastructure with no need to perform further validations.
After the credential issuance has been successfully performed, vehicle1 will be able
to communicate with other vehicles and services with a local-domain validation.
Now imagine a second vehicle, vehicle2, requesting information related to the
driver’s license of vehicle1. For the vehicle1 to verify is an authorized entity is
requesting the information, the following steps must be done.
1. vehicle1 received a message requesting information related to the driver’s
license.
2. Before granting any access to the information, vehicle1 requests to vehicle2
to provide a token that can prove that vehicle2 is an authorized entity, (e.g.
by proving the type of entity or an associated trust level).
3. vehicle2 generates and presents a token proving that is an authorized entity
(probably this information is disclosed), and that its associated trust level
is equal or greater than the one required to access the information.
4. vehicle1 performs both validations, on the associated certificate (issuing
CA, status of certificate, etc), and on the P-ABC that meets the defined
conditions.
5. Upon successful credential’s validation, vehicle1 selects the attributes from
the associated driver’s license, generates the token, and presents it to the
vehicle2.
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6. vehicle2 also performs the two validations on the information received.
Look that, this scenario suits the minimal information disclosure, since, vehi-
cles are able to decided on which attributes should be disclosed, meaning that,
the vehicle1 only needed to provide evidence that the associated driver’s license
was valid and there was no need to disclosed for example the driver’s nationality
that is currently visible in non-digital driver’s license.
5.2 Providing Anonymity and Unlinkability in
VANETs
Privacy in vehicular networks can be considered from different perspectives: i)
identity privacy (linking an identifier to an user or vehicle, ii) location privacy,
which includes speed, position and traveling routes, and iii) data privacy, which
includes not only information contained within the vehicle such as license plate
and driver’s identifiable information, but also by means of services requested by
the users/vehicles which leads to user profiling. So far, most of the research
efforts done in the privacy of VANETs have focused only in protecting user
identification and implicitly user’s location giving very little attention to the
information contained in vehicular communications. While identity and loca-
tion privacy have been addressed by proposing a wide range of pseudonimity
solutions, pseudonymity cannot prevent an attacker from collecting other user’s
related data; thus, user profiling can be achieved just by the passive collection
of communication information regarding vehicles’ activities, just by the simply
contents of their queries. The main objective of this section is to cope with the
privacy issued the lead to user profiling, by proposing an anonymous informa-
tion retrieval protocol mainly based on user collaboration to privately retrieve
information from Service Providers (SPs)
5.2.1 Introducing Query Forgery and Permutation
The proposed protocol is based on the one presented by (Rebollo-Monedero et al.,
2010), which relies on the concept of query forgery. Query forgery refers to the
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process of attaching bogus queries (1 or more) to the authentic ones, in order to
prevent an attacker or service provider to learn about users real interests, meaning
that, if just one user intends to query a service provider, the same user will send
two different queries and the service provider will not discern of which matches
the user’s real interests. In addition, two different approaches were introduced i)
query permutation on a chain of users and ii) query permutation of a trellis of
user. In the query permutation process, a number n of collaborating users attach
their queries and change the order of them before delivering to the corresponding
service provider, the approaches aforementioned differ from the form users are
organized to collaborate (chain and trellis) and thus, provide a different privacy
degree. Due to the special characteristics that are inherent to a VANET system,
this protocol focuses on the query permutation considering a chain of users rather
than a trellis of users, since in VANET is of utmost importance to consider the
performance issues derived from these type of solutions.
5.2.2 Assumptions
Before describing further details of the proposed protocol in a given scenario we
shall first introduce the considered assumptions corresponding to the vehicular
communication system and participant vehicles collaboration.
• It is assumed that neither the SP nor other cooperating vehicles can be
completely trusted regarding the disclosure of a user’s private information.
• Participant vehicles possess a pseudonym-based (short-term ID), managed
by an existent solution (e.g. previously proposed ABP for VANETs).
• Relying in the ABP protocol and presentation tokens, SPs are able to verify
is the entity requesting a service meets the required conditions.
• Services are provided in a “flat-rate” fashion where accountability is not an
issue.
• Vehicles mobility is spatially restricted and spatially dependent due to the
mobility patterns already defined by the infrastructure.
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• Temporary group navigation is possible due to the geographical proximity
and spatial dependency of vehicles.
• Messages exchanged by vehicles and SPs might be encrypted.
• Both queries and replies contain accurate information that may not be
perturbed.
5.2.3 Querying The Infrastructure
The proposed privacy protocol specifically aims to provide unlinkability by pre-
venting unauthorized disclosure of vehicle’s queries. This approach assumes the
existence of a pseudonym generation mechanism/solution that protects users’ real
identities, being aware that: pseudonyms provide temporary anonymity, but the
sole use of pseudonyms cannot prevent the whole user profiling process. Tech-
nically, the protocol is independent of the underlying security solution, although
the presented scenario relies on the existence of a pseudonym solution achieved
thanks to the implementation of attribute-based credentials, which in turn relies
on a PKI-OCSP based protocol including a set of traditional cryptographic mech-
anisms able to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the messages exchanged by
vehicles and SPs. The protocol also advantages VANET’s unique features by re-
lying on the existence of a cooperative structure of vehicles, which is possible due
to the fact that, vehicles travel along trajectories with geographical proximity to
other vehicles and making possible to navigate as a group. In the following the
main scenarios are described.
5.2.3.1 Vehicle Query Forgery - Simple Use Case Scenario
In the simple use case scenario, when a single vehicle must request a service from
the Service Provider (Figure 5.2), vehicle simply sends the query via RSU. With
the given scenario, either the RSU or the SP could relate the information of the
query to the actual vehicle. By implementing the query forgery concept, the
vehicle generates a forged query and send it along with the authentic one just as
illustrated in Figure 5.3, in order to ensure that a SP or any attacker overhearing
the communication cannot completely ascertain the vehicle’s current information
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Figure 5.2: A vehicle requesting a service - simple query scenario
Figure 5.3: A vehicle requesting a service - forged query scenario
interests. As shown in Figure 5.3, the authentic query is labeled with ‘1’, and the
forged one, with ‘0’. Thus, the SP cannot discern which of the submitted queries
is authentic or matches user’s real interests.
5.2.3.2 Vehicle’s Query Permutation - Extended Scenario
In the single-user case of Section 5.2.3.1 the transmission of two queries could be
regarded as the collaboration of two different vehicles, each of them submitting
a different query to the service provider, as a result, the service provider could
not discern which query belonged to whom. Note that a RSU could act as an
intermediate in the communication between vehicles and services providers, but
could also be referred as a service provider itself. In the following an extension
of the scenario described in (Figure5.3), which is based on vehicles’ collaboration
will be introduced. Based on the concept of query permutation on a chain of
users introduced in Section 5.2.1. This scenario consists of n vehicles which form
a chain. In this scenario the first vehicles, represented by vehicle 1, attaches two
different queries, an authentic and a forged one in random order, and forwards
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Figure 5.4: Service request through vehicles collaboration - forged query permu-
tation scenario
them to a second vehicle represented by vehicle 2, willing to participate, that
is, a vehicle with a clear intention of requesting a service. In turn, vehicle 2
generates its own query, and then produces a random permutation of the queries,
labeled in Figure 5.4 as ‘0’,‘1’ and ‘2’, respectively. The randomly permuted
list of queries is therefore sent to a third vehicle, vehicle 3, which performs the
same steps as vehicle 2. Theoretically, a maximum number of n vehicles could
collaborate, where, the last vehicle, vehicle n, will deliver to the service provider a
random permutation of (n+1) queries. In this scenario, neither the provider nor
the intermediate vehicles or RSU could know for certain which authentic query
was generated by which of the vehicles.
To deliver the corresponding (n+ 1) replies generated by the SP, the process
is reversed as shown in Figure 5.4.
5.2.4 Anonymous Information Retrieval (AIR) Protocol
The proposed approach could be implemented in two different operation modes
namely single query and group query communication, which somehow follow the
scenarios described in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 respectively.
5.2.4.1 Single Query Communication
This operation mode is the simplest and basically relies on the assumption that
there is no need for a previous establishment of a communication group to achieve
certain degree of privacy. Similar to Section 5.2.3.1, in this scenario, the first ve-
hicle, vehicle 1, transmits two queries (authentic and forged) as the collaboration
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of two different vehicles (real and imaginary). On reception, intermediate vehi-
cles (n− 1) might be willing to participate, and taking advantage of the already
started process, insert their own queries and perform the query permutation pro-
cess, so that, a better degree of privacy could be achieved. Note that in the
worst-case scenario, the SP will received only two queries. To deliver the corre-
sponding replies, a similar process must be performed, vehicle n will delete its
own query from the list and reverse the permutation before sending it to vehicle
(n-1). A important advantage is that because no previous group communication
must be established a better performance degree could be achieved. On the con-
trary, the main drawback of this approach is that provides a higher vulnerability
to statistical privacy attacks.
5.2.4.2 Group Query Communication
Opposite to the single query communication,in the group operation mode, the
initiator vehicle must first establish the group by performing the following steps:
1. Vehicle 1, initiates the handshaking process, by sending a “join group”
request to its neighbors1.
2. Once a number of acknowledgments are received, vehicle 1 will automati-
cally evaluate a set of parameters such as speed, direction and distance to
be able to select potential participants. At the application level this can be
achieve by implementing approaches such as the one described in (Borsetti
et al., 2009)
3. On selection, queries will be inserted and forwarded by the members of the
group following an order determined by a hash function, in order to prevent
strategic ordering of vehicles and therefore avoiding collusion attacks.
A clear advantage of the group operation mode lies in the fact that with collabo-
rative participation a higher privacy degree could be achieved. However, the main
disadvantage consists in the group establishment, not only from the performance
perspective, but from the dynamic nature of a VANET, nodes might leave the
communication range once agreed to participate.
1Nodes within communication range, typically within 250m distance
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Type Information
JoinGroupReq (R′) R′ = {ID||location||timestamp||payload}
AckGroupReq (A′) A′ = {ID||location||timestamp||payload}
Query Qn= {Query||QID}
Single query message (M) M = {Qn||IDn}
First vehicle message (M ′) M ′ = {Qn||Qn−1||IDn−1 ||IDn}
Multiple query representation (M ′′) M ′′= {Qn||Q1||Qn−1 ..IDn−1 ||ID1 ||IDn }
Table 5.1: Messages and queries definition
5.2.4.3 Message Definition
In vehicular communications, participant nodes exchange different types of mes-
sages, Table 5.1 shows the minimum information required by each of the messages
that are exchanged in the proposed protocol. In Table 5.1 the ID parameter refers
to a PseudoID (based on anonymous credentials) and the payload may contain
additional information such as vehicle direction and speed. The minimum number
of exchanged messages for the different operation modes is then determined as fol-
lows: For the single query communication mode, the total number of exchanged
messages will be 2 (M ′+ (n − 1)M ′′). In the group communication operation
mode, the initiator (first vehicle) will additionally broadcast a message R′ and
process a number of m(A′) messages. To provide confidentiality to queries, each
vehicle will encrypt its query with the SP’s public key SPpk. This on one hand
will protect the queries in such a way that collusion attacks would imply SP’s
participation. In addition, replies might also be ciphered with a temporary key
(session key) Vtk included in the message, and that cannot be linked to the user’s
real identity, and will prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the reply.
5.2.5 Discussion
The Anonymous Information Retrieval protocol is aimed at providing privacy
and unlinkability regarding both queries and replies for all collaborating vehicles
to reduce user profiling. Under the general assumption that neither vehicles nor
RSUs or SPs could be completely trusted. That is, if an attacker by any reason,
determines the link between two or more different pseudonyms might be able to
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automatically evaluate a vehicle’s position and/or trajectory, but will not be able
to disclosed vehicle’s requested services or particular interests. Even in the case,
where a pseudonym could be linked to driver’s real identity, a complete profile of
the driver and his activities could not be automatically generated. Note that, in
principle, for each 1 < v < n, vehicle’s v privacy can be completely compromised
only if the two participant vehicles in positions (v − 1) and (v + 1) in addition
to the service provider, collude to compare the information available to them
(list of queries and replies). Nonetheless, for this approach to be achievable,
still open issues must be taken into account. In particular efficiency in vehicular
networks has become a major concern; the dynamic nature of VANETs’ v2v and
v2i communications required a real-time transmission of information. In order
to fulfill the given real-time requirements, the privacy solution must be effective
and provide an acceptable performance in terms of computational and bandwidth
needs. Since, in the presented mechanism the number of queries and replies will
remain as (n + 1), which obviously imply more computational and bandwidth
overhead. In a similar form, the size of the packet will increase according to the
number of participants, specially when considering the cryptographic information
that will be included to provide confidentiality. Thus, the maximum number
of participating vehicles should also be taken into consideration. It is worth
to mention that, current approaches aimed a preventing user profiling in v2i
communications, have only considered the use of pseudonyms, which, as explain
in this chapter is not enough. Different authors have proposed the use of vehicular
groups along with a group signature scheme (Section 3.4), to provide anonymous
access to location based service applications in VANET. A clear disadvantage is




In privacy-conscious environments (e.g. eHealth), it is a common belief that indi-
viduals should be able to keep and manage access to their personal information,
for example by choosing to which entities their personal data should be disclosed.
This chapter focuses on VANET’s data privacy and trust management from the
driver’s centric approach, which is founded in a Context-Based Trust Validation
Model (TVM) introduced next.
6.1 Introduction
Inspired by eHealth systems, which highly demand the protection of a patient’s
personal data. The Trust Validation Model (TVM) focuses on the trust evalua-
tion of entities for protecting driver’s personal information from being disclosed
to unauthorized parties and, at the same time, to enable decision making based
on the trust level assigned to the communicating entities. In other words, the
driver’s explicit consent authorizes two different tasks i) disclosing his personal
identifiable information, possibly stored in the vehicle (e.g. electronic license
plate, driver’s license, etc.), or by presenting certain attributes that could be
categorized as private information, and ii) processing received information(e.g.
safety message) on intermittent infrastructure-less scenarios, where an online vali-
dation with the infrastructure, cannot be always performed, a further description
of these two scenarios is presented next, which will allow the definition of the
necessary components of the TVM introduced in Section 6.3.
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6.2 Use Case Scenarios
This section defines two infrastructure-less scenarios, where due to the lack of v2i
validations (Section 2.1.1), a security vulnerability exist and must be mitigated
by implementing additional mechanisms.
Scenario 1: Private Information Access Vehicles are considered highly per-
sonal devices that are kept for long, and as discussed in Chapter 2, will be
able to store great amounts of information, including private information,
therefore unauthorized access to such information should also be carefully
considered. Let’s take for example the scenario where a vehicle, vehicle1, is
requesting private information of the driver/vehicle (e.g. past locations) of
vehicle2, assuming that, the requesting entity, vehicle1, is an “emergency
vehicle” just as shown in Figure 6.1. This ’basic’ scenario, raises a few
questions: i) if messages in VANET will be sent anonymously, how does
the vehicle2 verifies the type of entity of vehicle1, ii) how can the trust level
of vehicle1 could be defined and therefore validated?,iii) under which cir-
cumstances will vehicle2 disclose the information, and moreover iv) which
information should be disclosed?.
To be able to answer this questions, it is important to define the context in
which the access to the information will be granted, and exactly what type
of information will be accessed. The context of the information will then
support the trust validation process that will ultimately allow vehicles to
take the appropriate decisions.
Scenario 2: Messages Processing Broadcasting messages to warn drivers about
different situations, is one of the most important applications in VANETs.
Imagine that, a vehicle, vehicle1 receives a number n of “warning” messages
from supposedly n vehicles reporting an accident a few kilometers away, just
as depicted in Figure 6.2. This scenario, which is expected to become a com-
mon scenario in VANET’s safety applications, and where messages are sent
anonymously, raises a very important question: how will vehicle1 know if
messages should be trusted?.
69





which attributes to 
disclose?
Figure 6.1: An emergency vehicle is requesting private information to another
vehicle on the road.
To be able to answer that particular question, it is of utmost importance to
learn about the current situation or context, e.g. how many messages were
received?, were all messages originated from the same vehicle?, what kind
of entities were involved?, from which direction are messages coming? and
how fresh are these messages?. To cope with these issues, it is necessary
to provide a component able to validate the trust level by evaluating the
context parameters that will be provided, and therefore reject or accept the
message by for example lowing the speed, taking a different route, etc.
As it can be observed, in both scenarios it is necessary to implement a mecha-
nism able to evaluate the overall trust level defined by the combination of different
variables provided by the context. Based on the trust level, vehicles then will be
able to take the appropriate decisions.
6.3 Trust Validation Model
The Trust Validation Model (TVM) mainly supports decision making, by evalu-
ating the trust level of contexts derived from the aforementioned scenarios. The
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Figure 6.2: A vehicle received n warning messages reporting a road accident.
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TVM, first classifies the type information contained in the vehicle and the type of
messages to be exchanged by assigning different labels to the information accord-
ing to its sensitivity level, secondly, validates the sender’s or requestor trust level,
according to a set of attributes previously assigned, and mainly based on the role
and the type of an entity along with other context information. This process
is achieved thanks to the proposed P-ABC protocol presented in Section 5.1.1.
Finally, it matches the context information with a pre-defined policy, which, in
turn will specify the action that should be performed.
Before further describing the TVM, it is important to mention that, the TVM
relies in the following assumptions:
• The existence of Tamper Proof Device (TPD) or Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) able to store security information and perform crytographic/secure
operations.
• The communications in the covered scenarios, are done anonymously.
• Trust validation can be performed even if no “online” validations via v2i
communications are available.
• As already mentioned, the existence of an attribute-based solution is as-
sumed, in this proposal the TVM takes advantage of the P-ABC protocol.
Next, the basic concepts behind the information classification will be clarified.
6.3.1 Information Classification
For the sake of simplicity initial classification of the information will be performed
in correspondence to the type of scenarios aforementioned. However, any driver
should be able to establish its own classification according to his particular privacy
and trust concerns.
6.3.1.1 Private Information
Private information refers to all kinds of information that could be stored in the
vehicle, this obviously, includes attribute credentials and the attributes to be
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disclosed to corresponding authorized parties. In this classification, Information
Labels (IL) will be assigned according to the corresponding scenario, and, the re-
quired privacy level (from now on referred as the Global Security Level (GSL)1)
to access it will be assigned, note that, the privacy level assigned to the informa-
tion, should correspond to the GSL provided in the TVM (further discussed in
Section 6.3.3. An example of labels that could be applied are described next:
• Liability: private information that should be disclosed to authorized parties
only in situations where liability is required (i.e. authorized law enforcement
agents);
• Emergency: information that should be disclosed to authorized parties in
emergency situations (i.e. emergency vehicle -paramedics).
• Services: information that should be disclosed to services offered by the
infrastructure (e.g. when accessing infotainment applications). Note, that
this information is application related, and will strictly depend on the ser-
vices available in the infrastructure.
• Personal: information that should be disclosed to authorized parties for
example to interact with known vehicles when traveling in groups.
• Public: information accessible to any party, no privacy checks are required
by the own vehicle in order to be disseminated. In turn, receivers might
need to perform trust validations, in order to decide whether or not received
information must be trusted, which is strongly related to the classification
presented next.
6.3.1.2 Public Information
This classification refers to all the information in VANETs that is public to its
participants, and that it is no precisely stored in the vehicle, but in turn is rep-
resented by commonly exchanged messages with the main objective of informing
1Terminology defined by the REM methodology Section 4.2.3.2
73




< other … >Safety
Collaboration
PRIVATE INFORMATION





Figure 6.3: Generic Classification of Information.
vehicles about various situations, such as, traffic management, emergency warn-
ings, or nodes misbehavior. Therefore, within this classification, information
could be labeled as follows:
• Emergency: public information about emergency situations such a fatal
road accidents where actions are required and therefore must not be ignored.
• Safety: public information mainly about road conditions, specially aimed
at preventing potential accidents.
• Traffic management: public information to alert vehicles about traffic con-
gestion, aimed at improving the traffic flow, where actions such as lowing
the speed, or changing trajectories might be required.
• Control: public information that is periodically sent in the form of ’hello
beacons’.
• Collaboration: information that will be disseminated to request vehicle’s
collaboration such as group forming to various objectives.
As it can be inferred from Figure 6.3, classification of messages could also be
extended, naturally considering the driver’s trust concerns, since in most of them,
74
6.3 Trust Validation Model
different actions are required, additionally a trust level referred also GSL should
be assigned. Nevertheless, before trust-based decisions can be taken either for
an entity willing to access driver’s private information or to decide whether or
not to trust any received public information, its is mandatory to perform a trust
evaluation on involved entities’ attribute credentials, next section introduces the
relation between VANETs involved entities and their corresponding trust levels.
6.3.2 Defining Entity’s Trust Level
Trust Levels (TLs) will be provided to entities participating in VANETs in the
form of attribute to be disclosed in different scenarios such as the ones described
in Section 6.2. In order to define what level of trust must be assigned to vehicles,
first, a general classification of vehicles must be done, the type of the vehicle will
be referred as Entity Type (ET). Note, that vehicles can be classified according to
a wide range of parameters. However, in the proposed context only the vehicle’s
‘role’ will be considered. As a result, a ET can be for example emergency, police,
traffic authority, private vehicle, etc. Initially, a default TL could be assigned
by authorities issuing credentials and the TL will correspond to the ET of the
vehicle.
• Zero Trust: (TL = 0), an entity which trust level cannot be validated or
that, actually posses a zero trust value (further discussed in this section).
• Low Trust: (TL = 1), first level of trust that can be assigned by default to
private vehicles.
• Medium Trust: (TL = 2), second level trust that can be assigned by default
to regional authorities such as police vehicles or traffic authorities.
• Semi-full Trust: (TL = 3), third level trust, that can be assigned bye default
to emergency vehicles, and other related authorities.
• Full Trust: (TL = 4), fourth level trust assigned either to enforcing law
authorities in liability cases, or manually assigned by the driver to an entity
which is well known and fully trusted.
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Note that with the implementation of reputation systems or any other solution,
able to detect both misbehaving nodes and collaborating ones, it is very likely
that the default assigned values will change. In this scenario, credentials, will be
updated to the new TL level, where, misbehaving vehicles could loss credibility
when decreasing their default TL or become some kind of reference when, due to
collaborating behavior the TL is increased. Therefore a TL namely ’Untrusted’
with a (TL = −1) is also defined, specially for misbehaving vehicles during the
warning period1. In summary, the combination of the TL and the ET attributes,
will partly define the context in which information could be trusted or disclosed.
Next section introduces the TVM main components, followed by the description
of the main processes.
6.3.3 Model Components
• Credential Validator: Provides the necessary mechanisms to validate the
provided P-ABCs.
• Information Classifier (IC): This module determines the type of information,
that has been requested or has been received. Once the information type
has been identified, obtains the corresponding GSL required to perform any
action defined in the corresponding policy.
• Context Manager (CM): This module is in charge of storing for time (t) (a
pre-defined time interval), context information, that will be provided to the
TE enabling the GSL validation.
• Trust Evaluator (TE): This module establishes different context scenarios
in order to validate the corresponding GSL needed to match any pre-defined
policy.
• Policy Manager (PM): This module provides the mechanisms to be able to
define, validate and match any pre-defined policy. Based on the information
received from the rest of the modules, matches the corresponding policy,
and, upon results an action can be performed.
1Assuming that, vehicles will not always operate in the same mode.
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Figure 6.4: Communication flow among the TVM components.
6.4 Trust Evaluation Communication Flow
Going back to the scenarios described in Section 6.2, this section will illustrate
how will trust validation will be achieved, by describing the main flow among the
different components of the TVM, just as shown in Figure 6.4 . Access control
will be introduced next, followed by the message processing scenario.
6.4.1 Context-based Access Control for Private Informa-
tion
A VANET’s vehicle is able to request any available service to the infrastructure,
but at the same time can offer and request “services” to other vehicle. Let’s take
for example the scenario depicted in Figure 6.1, an emergency vehicle requesting
information. The vehicle will need to identify first which entity is requesting
information, to be able to select the corresponding attributes that might be dis-
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closed. However, since the communications are assumed to be done in an anony-
mous fashion, how will the vehicle perform the authorization checks and decided
whether or not the access to its information will be granted?. To achieve this
goal, on one hand the driver/vehicle can decide which personal information can
be accessible and the minimum required security level to access such information,
and on the other hand the requestor should provide the necessary attributes that
will allow the vehicle to perform the trust validation.
In Previous research (Serna et al., 2008) a Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
model was proposed. The MAC model performed the evaluation of a TL con-
tained in the Attribute Certificate (AC) of the requestor, and matched the TL
with the authorization levels assigned to an entity’s personal information. Ba-
sically, by relying on i) the Simple Security Property (no read-up) and ii) the
*-Property (no write-down). However, further research identify more complex
scenarios where the simple evaluation of an static authorization level was not
be enough, therefore, to perform the trust validation of an entity, additional at-
tributes need to be disclosed, which, will be validated by the CV, just as described
next.
Credentials validation : vehicle1 receives an information request from vehicle2,
for this particular scenario, the CV component performs the validation of
two different attributes (i.e. ET and TL), if no credential validation can be
performed default values (ET = Unknown, TL = −1) will be passed to the
TE. In this example, it is assumed that the CV could successfully validate
the credentials and obtain the values ET = Emergency and TL = 3.
Information Classifier : the IC component will then identify the type of in-
formation that is being requested in correspondence to the defined labels,
lets assumed that for the emergency situation, the information has been la-
beled as IL=“Emergency”. Next the IC will obtain the GSL level required
for “Emergency” label, let us say GSL = 3.
Context Manager : The CM can provide to the TE and the PM additional
context information when applicable.
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Trust Evaluator : The TE component will receive information from the CV and
the CM (if needed), and will then perform context validations and finally
assign a GSL level, in this scenario the TL will be directly assigned,(i.e.
GSL = 3)
Policy Manager : Finally the PM will receive the information from the CV
{ET = Emergency}, the TE {GSL = 3}, the IC {GSL = 3, IL =
Emergency},and optionally (scenario-dependent) from the CM, and , through
the policy matcher the final validation will be performed, and the action
pre-defined in the policy will be executed (i.e. grant or deny access), within
the policy matcher, the validation of the GSL will be performed based on
the properties defined in the described MAC model.
Note, that if any other authoritative vehicle possess the same TL, because
the TE will be different, will not be able to retrieve information with IL =
Emergency if not explicitly defined in the policy, which with the previous model
(MAC)could not be achieved. Moreover, as mentioned before, because of the
behavior of vehicles, the TL might change in time, thus for a misbehaving emer-
gency vehicle, let us say with TL = 1, even though the ET will prove that is an
authority, because of its TL the information access will not be granted. Next a
more complex scenario will be discussed.
6.4.2 Context-based Information Trust
This section defines the communication flow among components of the TVM, in
scenarios where public information is disseminated in order to alert other vehicles
of an event, and for a vehicle to be able to execute any action a trust validation
must be performed. In particular, this section takes as reference the scenario
presented in Figure 6.2, where a vehicle, vehicle1 receives n number of warning
messages, from supposedly n vehicles reporting a road accident. In the next
sections two important processes namely i) context validation definition and ii)
policy definition are described, followed by the communication flow definition.
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6.4.2.1 Defining the Context Validation
The TE component is in charge of performing trust validations with an output
represented by the GSL. Trust validations might depend on the context informa-
tion, thus, different validations could be performed from one scenario to another.
This is mainly because trust validations are mostly user-defined, and strongly
dependent on the driver’s privacy or trust concerns. In other words, similar to
policy definition, the user defines which context information must be considered
for each of the defined scenarios, and based on those specifications, a set of at-
tributes (e.g. location, pseudoID, ET, TL, etc.) will be validated, to match
either all possible scenarios or only specific ones. Focusing on the aforementioned
scenario, where vehicle1 receives warning messages to alert of an accident, de-
ciding whether or not to trust, could be supported if a number of conditions
are met. This conditions are established in terms of context information, to be
more specific, if n = 1, meaning that vehicle1 receives only one warning message,
from a vehicle which credentials could not be verified i.e. (ET = Unknown and
TL = −1), it can be obvious that the message will be discarded. However, if
in the context validation definition, a minimum threshold minM = m has been
defined, and n > minM , trust validations will provide a different outcome. Now
imagine a more complex scenario, where more than one condition should be met,
e.g. a minimum threshold of messages minM = m belonging to entities with a
TL > minTL if all conditions are met, probably the GSL will be calculated as
in Equation 6.1, however, if conditions are not met, the lowest TL value could
be directly assigned i.e. GSL = TL. As it can be inferred, the definition of the
context validation can be customized according to each driver’s concerns. In a







6.4.2.2 Evaluating Information Trust
Going back the scenario 2 presented in Section 6.2, and assuming that in the
TVM, the TE has already a context validation defined and policies have been
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established, the TVM will implement the following validations.
Credentials validation : vehicle1 receives a number n of “warning” messages
from supposedly n vehicles reporting an accident a few kilometers away, for
this scenario, the CV component performs the validation of three different
attributes (i.e. ET, TL and location), if no credential validation can be
performed default values for each messages/entity will be (ET = Unknown,
TL = −1), this values are deliver to the TE.
Information Classifier : the IC component will then identify the type of in-
formation that is being requested in correspondence to the defined labels,
lets assumed that for the warning alerts, the information has been labeled
as IL = Emergency. Next the IC will obtain the GSL level required for
“Emergency” label of public information, let us say GSL = 4.
Context Manager : The CM will provide to the TE and the PM additional
context information when applicable, for this scenario,the PM will provide
additional information regarding vehicles locations, ETs, and possibly di-
rection or speed, the TE will evaluate the context information such as if
the n come from different ’locations’. This is done because it is not easy to
discern if the n messages come from a single vehiclen using n pseudonyms
or they actually come from n different vehicles, thus additional attributes
should be validated, considering that first alerts do not reach any of the
defined threshold and the GSL = 1.
Trust Evaluator : The TE component will receive information from the CV
and the CM, and will then perform context validations and finally assign
a GSL level, in this scenario the TL will not be directly assigned, since
different threshold have to be met to get one value or another for the GSL.
Policy Manager : Finally the PM will receive the information from the CV
{ET = Emergency}, the TE {GSL = 1}, the IC {GSL = 4, IL =
Emergency}, and optionally (scenario-dependent) from the CM {location1,
... ,locationn, attr1, .. attrn}, and , through the policy matcher the final
validation will be performed, and the action pre-defined in the policy will
be executed (e.g. discard, reroute, etc).
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Analyzing the trade-offs between
security and performance
The unique characteristics of a VANET highlighted in Chapter 2, require the
adoption of security protocols with little impact on the overall system perfor-
mance, but at the same time secure enough to achieve the drivers’ trust. This
chapter shows empirical results obtained from our quantitative analysis and sim-
ulations, and discusses them from both performance and security perspectives.
7.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, different security and privacy protocols that mainly work
at the application layer have been introduced. However to assure their feasibil-
ity and integration within a mobile network, a set of specific VANET constraints
must be taken into consideration. In this chapter it will be quantitatively demon-
strated that the proposed protocols do respect these constraints. At this aim, a
set of experiments has been designed, mainly consisting of an hybrid approach
that includes i) the evaluation of the implementation of main cryptographic pro-
tocols discussed in Section 4.6 and, ii) their simulation to evaluate the incurred
transmission delays generated by the messages’ security overhead (Section 7.2.1).
We analyze the proposed protocols’ performance in terms of the communication
time required for each one of the exchanged messages. The overall communica-
tion time (Raya & pierre Hubaux, 2005) (Xiaodong et al., 2008) is represented as
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Message Format Type
ID
M ’ {location||timestamp||message||pseudoID} Without Security
S’ M’ + SigSk {M’} Signed Message
A’ M’ ||CertID + SigSk {M’ ||CertID} Authentication
Message
Table 7.1: Signed and authentication messages format
the sum of all the processing and transmission delays from the messages in any
of the proposed protocols for both v2v and v2i communication. In this proposal,
the evaluated times take into consideration two factors:
1. The total communication time for a single message in both v2v and v2i
scenarios.
2. The number of exchanged messages by each one of the proposed protocols.
7.2 Communication Time Estimation
It is expected that vehicles in a VANET will generate signed messages with their
own private key (Sk), attaching the corresponding public key certificate identifier
(CertID) in order for the relying party to perform the validation processes de-
scribed in Section 4.6.1. As mentioned in Section 4.6.1, the rationale behind using
a certificate identifier instead of the full certificate is basically to keep the security
overhead low in the proposed protocols (this will be experimentally demonstrated
in Section 7.2.2).
Table 7.1 shows the different types of messages to be exchanged within the
security protocols proposed in Chapter 4 and analyzed in this section:
As shown in Table 7.1, authentication messages will only include the CertID,
The receiver in turn will extract the corresponding information, verify the signa-
ture and validate the certificate. As a consequence, the communication time and
also the message size will greatly depend on the cryptographic protocols that are
chosen. Thus, the relationship between the security protocols, processes and the
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overall communication time (Tp) can be represented as the sum of the 4 main
parameters shown in Equation 7.1.
1. Time to format and sign a single message (Ts)
2. Time to transmit the message (Tt )
3. Time to cryptographically verify the message’s signature (Tv)
4. Validation time (Ta) -basic or extended path validation on the message -
Tp = a · (Ts + Tv + Tt + Ta) (7.1)
Note that, signing, verification and validation times (Ts, Tv and Ta ) can be
directly evaluated, as they depend on hardware nodes and not on the mobility
features. On the other hand, the transmission time Tt is affected by vehicle’s
mobility, speed, transmission rates and packet size. Therefore the Tt will be
estimated via simulations.
7.2.1 Cryptographic Overhead
In order to provide greater insight into the performance trade-offs in asymmetric
cryptographic protocols, performed experiments will consist of:
1. measuring a message’s signature generation and verification times
2. performing a VANET certificate validation process, using the basic and
extended path mechanisms
3. performing a set of simulations to determine the transmission delays intro-
duced by the security overhead.
Next, the most representative outcomes obtained for 1 and 2 will be presented,
while 3 will be introduced in Section 7.2.2.
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7.2.1.1 Signature and Verification Times
At the state of the art, different proposals for implementing PKI in VANETs,
have used the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA- (Petit, 2009)
(Blake-Wilson et al., 2002) instead of the RSA cryptosystem (RSA, 2002) typi-
cally found in “traditional” PKIs. On the one hand, the WAVE standard spec-
ification (Committee, 2007) supports the implementation of the ECDSA cryp-
tographic algorithm for authentication in VANETs, assuming that contrary to
RSA, the ECDSA cryptosystem minimally impacts performance. However, this
is mainly due to the large size of RSA certificates, which, on the other hand
has been extensively adopted by OCSP-based approaches implemented by (e.g.
financial institutions). Although recent updates on the RFC 2560 (Santesson &
Hallam-Baker, 2010), have introduced support to other cryptographic algorithms
such as ECDSA. In order to show the performance trade-offs among the two
widely used asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in the proposed protocol, the
first experiment consisted of measuring the message generation and verification
times, using both the RSA and the ECDSA cryptographic algorithms. Note that
the performance of cryptographic algorithms can be strongly affected by the hard-
ware capabilities and the library used to perform them. Over the past few years,
different researchers have attempted to demonstrate the performance impact of
the two well-known cryptographic algorithms RSA and ECDSA (Petit, 2009),
(Mart́ınez-Silva et al., 2007), concluding that ECDSA outperforms RSA, thus
making it more suitable for resource constraint scenarios. Taking into consider-
ation that currently there is no agreement about VANETs’ on-board hardware
capabilities, illustrative measures taken from an experiment done with a Core
II Duo 2Ghz processor and 2GB RAM will be presented. All messages, signa-
tures and certificates were generated and verified with the OpenSSL 0.9.8o library
(OpenSSL, 2010) using RSA with a key length of 1024bits and an ECDSA with a
key length of 192bits. In both cases, the SHA-1 hash function was used. Finally,
the percentage of the security overhead is represented assuming that typically, in
a VANET, the exchanged messages will be of around 200 bytes (NHTS, 2006).
From Table 7.2 it can observe that, for the obtained times (Ts and Tv) there
is not a considerable difference between both algorithms (in fact it was approx-
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eSigning Signature generation Signature Signature % security
algorithm (hash + crypt) verification size overhead
time Ts time Tv
RSA 0.009s 0.007 s 128 bytes 64%
ECDSA 0.011s 0.011s 55 bytes 27.5%
Table 7.2: Signature generation and verification times
imately 37.5%). Now, considering the total number of messages exchanged by
the protocols, our belief is that the generation and verification times will not
severely impact the overall performance of the VANET. Moreover, even though
RSA slightly outperformed ECDSA, this is probably due to the impact of the
cryptographic protocols on the size of the signed messages. ECDSA performs
better overall because the security overhead introduced represents only 27,5% of
a 200 byte message (whereas in RSA, it represented the 64% of it). Thus, the
importance of carefully designing the contents of the each message (e.g. the de-
sign decision of using certificate’s identifiers instead of the full certificate inside
the transmitted messages).
7.2.1.2 Authentication Time Estimation
In order to quantify the validation time required to perform either the basic or
the extended path validation (as described in Chapter 4), two periods of time
have been measured:
• The time required to cryptographically validate a certificate (basic path
validation).
• The time required by the OCSP Responder to validate a certificate (as
required by the extended path validation) (OCSP, 2011).
Obtained results are shown in Table 7.3
7.2.2 Transmission Overhead
Due to VANETs special features In VANETs, one of the important requirements
is that, the security scheme should be efficient in terms of small communication
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Path validation Validation time (Ta)
Basic path validation (RSA) 0.006s
Basic path validation (ECDSA) 0.007s
Extended path validation (OCSP Responder) 0.002s
Table 7.3: Certificate validation execution times
overhead and acceptable processing latency. To be able to determine the trans-
mission delays introduced by the security overhead, the transmission times of a
single message generated including the signature of the different cryptographic
protocols are measured. To have a more realistic insight of a VANET system,
an experimental simulation aimed at evaluating the packet transmission time(Tt)
between two VANET’s nodes has been configured. Next section defines the sim-
ulation scenario followed by the most representative outcomes obtained.
7.2.2.1 Simulation Scenario
The experimental setup was based on an urban scenario similar to the Eixample
district of the city of Barcelona. The scenario consisted of 100 vehicles distributed
in a 1km2 grid map. The map included traffic lanes and lights, and vehicles with
variable speeds between 5-55km/hr, including accelerations and decelerations and
a maximum pause time of 2s. The simulation time was setup to 1000s and,
during this time, the nodes followed different trajectories in a reflective mode
(once the destination was reached, vehicles followed a different trajectory). The
nodes’ mobility pattern was generated using the Manhattan mobility model with
the MobiSim (Mousavi et al., 2007) and the SUMO tool (Behrisch et al., 2011).
Simulations were performed with the widely adopted Network Simulator tool
(NS2, 2012), considering traffic loads1 of 15, 25, 35, and 45. The transmission
range was setup to 250m, with a transmission rate of 4pckts/s and a data rate of
6Mb.
The packet size was configured according to each scenario corresponding to
security overhead introduced by the different cryptographic algorithms; that is 55
bytes for an ECDSA signature (using key length of 192 bits), 128 bytes for a RSA
1The number of nodes that simultaneously transmitted information.
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Simulation area 1km2
Simulation time 1000s
Type of area Urban
Routing protocol AODV
Max queue length 50
Bandwidth 6Mb/s
Node density 100 vehicles
Speed range 5-55km
Transmission range 250m
Message size {38, 55, 128 and 600} bytes
Transmission rate 4pckt/s =0.25 interval
Table 7.4: NS2 configuration parameters
Figure 7.1: Random assigned vehicles spatial distribution
signature (using a key length of 1024 bits), 38 bytes for the ID of the certificate
CertID (as defined in Table 4.1) and 600 bytes, considering a X.509v3 standard
certificate with ECDSA signature (generated with the OpenSSL library). Table
7.4 summarizes the set of parameters used for the NS2 setup.
The initial distribution of nodes was randomly assigned (Figure 7.1) and the
number of connection links was selected according to the different traffic loads.
During the simulation time, transmitting nodes where not always in direct com-
munication range with destination nodes (therefore, most packets were delivered
via multi-hop).
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7.2.2.2 Experimental Results
The results of the incurred transmission delays for both types of signatures are
shown in Figure 7.2. It can be observed that with messages of 55 bytes cor-
responding to the ECDSA Signature, the performance was slightly better than
with the 128 bytes of the RSA signature (7ms and 8ms respectively, considering
a traffic load of 35 nodes). However, if the overall messages in a VANET are
being signed, it is easy to conclude that ECDSA implies a better transmission
performance. Moreover, the traffic load is an additional factor that will affect
the communications. As shown in Figure 7.2, the transmission delays achieved
in a VANET with a traffic load of 40 nodes is almost the double than those
achieved while transmitting 25 nodes; therefore, the need to minimize the secu-
rity information to be included in each packet. Let us, for example, compare
the transmission delays of 21 ms corresponding to the 600 byte packets of a full
X.509v3 certificate with ECDSA and the transmission delay of 6.8ms incurred by
the certificate identifier (CertID), which consists of a 38 bytes packet (according
to Table 1), both with a traffic load of 35 nodes. In this case, we emphasize, once
again, the importance of carefully designing the contents of each authentication
message (e.g. using a CertID in most messages instead of the full certificate inside
the transmitted message).
Figure 7.3 shows that if up to 45 vehicles simultaneously transmit information,
the packet delivery rate remains above the 95% for a 600 byte message size, which
is suitable enough for a VANET environment. However, this can be improved
to 98% considering solely the use of a CertID. As for the size of the different
signatures, it can concluded that, since the size of the packet remains relatively
low there is no significant difference between them and the overall PDR for both
is above the 98%. On the other hand, for a traffic load of 45 or more transmitting
nodes, we noticed that as the packet size increased, the packet delivery rate
decreased. If a congested scenario (more than 50 vehicles transmitting within
transmission range) is considered, large packet sizes will drastically impact the
number of packets being delivered. Thus, the sole use of identifiers in a message
will significantly reduce the packet size (in approximately 93.6% when compared
with those messages containing a full X.509v3 certificate attached).
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Figure 7.2: Security overhead transmission delay
Figure 7.3: Security overhead packet delivery rate
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eSigning Algorithm Message Communication time (s)
RSA 0.030 s
ECDSA 0.036 s
Table 7.5: v2v single message communication time
7.3 Exchanged Messages Computation
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the overall communication time of the pro-
posed authentication protocol, depends on three factors: i) the electronic signa-
ture algorithm, ii) the security overhead that influences the overall transmission
time and, iii) the total number of exchanged messages related with the authenti-
cation protocol itself. In Section 7.2.1 we have quantitatively evaluated the first
two factors (signature, verification and transmission time for a single message);
in this subsection will be presented an estimation of the total number of mes-
sages needed by the protocols described in Section 4.6, Figure 4.6, Figure 4.5 and
Figure 4.7. In particular it will be evaluated the time required by the overall
communications introduced by the protocols in terms of messages exchanged and
the communication time required for these messages.
7.3.1 Communication Overhead in v2v
For the v2v protocol the minimum number of required messages is: 4. Thus, the
overall communication time (Tcv2v) can be represented as in Equation 7.2:
Tcv2v = a · (Ts + Tv + Tt + TAlocal) (7.2)
Where, as a derivation from Equation 7.1, Ts represents the time to format
and sign a single message and Tv the time to cryptographically verify a messages
signature (Section 7.2.1), Tt denotes the transmission time (Section 7.2.2), and
TAlocal represents the basic path validation time.In the following table we present
the computation of the different timings for a single exchanged message in the
protocol:
As shown in Table 7.5 and considering that vehicles will send messages on
intervals of 300ms (Armstrong, 2012b), these results prove to be good enough for
91
7.3 Exchanged Messages Computation
eSigning Algorithm Message Communication time (s)
RSA 0.032 s
ECDSA 0.038 s
Table 7.6: v2i single message communication time
processing received data before creating a new message. As a result, according
to Equation 7.2 the overall communication time introduced by the protocol is
Tcv2v = 4 ·(0.009+0.007+0.008+0.006) = 120ms for RSA and Tcv2v = 4 ·(0.011+
0.011 + 0.007 + 0.007) = 144ms for ECDSA, note that this values represent the
time for authentication in the whole communication process among two vehicles.
7.3.2 Communication Overhead in v2i
The v2i communication protocol requires a minimum of 4 exchanged messages
(CertID attached). Again in analogy to Equation 7.1, we represent the overall
communication time (Tcv2i) as:
Tcv2i = a · (Ts + Tv + Tt + TAv2I) (7.3)
Where: Ts represents the time to format and sign a single message, Tv the
time to cryptographically verify a messages signature , Tt denotes the transmission
time, and TAv2I represents the extended path validation time. Note, that TAv2I
includes the Authentication System time and the OCSP responder time, which
according to (EJBCA OCSP) is capable of processing approximately 500 requests
per second. The following table presents the timings introduced by the proposed
protocol as a result of the experimental results.
In the v2i scenario the extended path validation (Section 4.2.3) is performed,
so the computed times increase due to the OCSP responder overhead as shown in
Table 7.6. As a result, the total computation of Tcv2i = 4 ·(0.009+0.007+0.008+
0.008) = 128ms for RSA and Tcv2i = 4 · (0.011 + 0.011 + 0.007 + 0.009) = 152ms
for ECDSA. Notice that in this scenario we have not measured transmission
delays within the infrastructure (e.g. communication between the OCSP servers),




7.3.3 Communication Overhead in v2v2i
Finally the v2v communication protocol with infrastructure availability represents
a combination of the v2v and v2i scenarios. In this case, the minimum number
of required messages is 8, and the overall communication time Tcv2v2i becomes:
Tcv2v2i = a · (Ts + Tv + Tt + TAv2I) (7.4)
Where: as in Equation 7.2, Ts represents the time to format and sign a single
message, Tv the time to cryptographically verify a messages signature , Tt denotes
the transmission time, and TAv2I represents the extended path validation time.
In summary, the communication time of a message with either RSA or ECDSA –
with extended path validation– will be of 30ms and 37ms respectively. Therefore
the total authentication process Tcv2v2i according to Equation 7.4 is Tcv2v2i =
8 · (30) = 240ms for RSA signatures and Tcv2v2i = 8 · (37) = 296ms for EDCSA
signatures. These results considered the whole authentication process needed in
the communication among two vehicles with infrastructure availability.
7.4 Discussion
Even though PKI-based solutions have been identified as a viable solution (Kargl
et al., 2008) (Gerlach et al., 2007) (Parno & Perrig, 2005) (Raya & Hubaux, 2007)
and is recommended in emerging standards (Committee, 2007), new approaches
which are not based on PKI (Lin et al., 2007), (Mahmoud Al-Qutayri, 2010) ar-
gue that the main drawback of the latter is the large size of public key certificates
exchanged among vehicles, which significantly affects performance. Typically, the
size of a standard X.509v3 RSA full certificate is around 1024 bytes and ECDSA
is around 600 bytes, however, as explained in (Mart́ınez-Silva et al., 2007) and
(Petit, 2009), by applying different techniques an ECDSA X.509v3 certificate can
be reduced. Nevertheless, in our experiments, we have considered 600 bytes as
the upper bound of an ECDSA in order to measure the transmission delays in-
curred from the certificate exchange. In summary, performed simulations have
demonstrated that the overall transmission delay of a certificate of 600 bytes is of
10ms, with a traffic load of 25 transmitting nodes, and 20ms, with a traffic load
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of 35 nodes, which does not represent a major impact in non-congested scenarios.
However, considering that increasing traffic loads will result in increasing delays,
to minimize the impact, we propose the use of CertIDs. Looking back to the
graph in Figure 4, with a traffic load of 35 nodes, the CertID has a transmission
delay that represents less than 50% of the one incurred by the full certificate
(9ms and 20ms respectively). Therefore, our design decision of issuing messages
with a CertID just as used by the OCSP standard (Myers et al., 1999). More-
over, if we consider two vehicles traveling in opposite directions at the maximum
allowed speed (55km/h) in urban regions, the minimal potential communication
duration will be of 10s. During those 10s, the vehicles will transmit messages
every 300ms, thus the transmission time of a CertID will only represent 3.33%
of the 300ms that a vehicle has to spend in order to process a single message.
Note that, during the potential communication period, vehicles are assumed to
be in each other’s direct transmission range (300m). This means that outside
the direct transmission range, the potential duration of communication will in-
crease if intermediate nodes are available to deliver messages via multi hop. Note
that non-standard certificates such as originally proposed in (NHTS, 2006), could
also reduce the total size of the certificate and related communication messages,
but as highlighted by the authors, no interoperability will be provided among
PKIs. Thus, in EU member states, this solution might not be feasible to im-
plement (take, for example, the electronic National ID cards in the EU, where
interoperability was a design criteria from the beginning). Finally, it is also worth
mentioning that approaches such as (Borsetti et al., 2009) work at the application
level, so that vehicles might be able to select communication nodes according to
their geo-location and trajectories (position, direction and speed). This strategy
improves the overall protocol’s performance by disallowing communication with
vehicles traveling in opposite direction and in which the communication duration





This thesis has analyzed general security and privacy issues that are present in
VANETs. First, the importance of interoperability for VANET’s authentication,
along with all the challenges it conveys has been introduced. In order to create
secure and dynamic interoperability relationships among untrusted CAs, a secu-
rity model that makes use an Authentication System (AS) has been proposed.
The AS is in charge of performing the contributed Extended Path Validation pro-
cess by validating credentials in near real-time using the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) and, quantitatively evaluating a CA’s security level through a
Trusting CA component that implements the Reference Evaluation Methodology
(REM). Secondly, the privacy issues that remained open despite the AS imple-
mentation, were extensively discussed. As it has been explained, to be able to pro-
vide conditional privacy/anonymity and prevent attacks related to the big brother
scenario, additional mechanisms are needed. To provide conditional anonymity
and minimal information disclosure, the Attributed-Based Privacy (ABP) pro-
tocol has been proposed. The protocol implements Privacy-Attributed-Based
Credentials, to selectively select the attributes that should be disclosed to an
authorized party. The P-ABCs also implement a pseudonym-based solution able
to provide conditional anonymity. Relying on the proposed protocols, a Trust
Validation Model(TVM) has been proposed, to address trust validation of en-
tities and support decision making in infrastructure-less scenarios. Finally, an
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analysis of the trade-offs between security and performance when implementing
inter-vehicular authentication across different PKI domains is presented.
8.2 Future work
Future research directions are aimed at enforcing the TVM in infrastructure-less
scenarios, by exploring reputation based systems, and more efficient revocation
information distribution mechanisms. As future work, a performance analysis
in Privacy-ABC technologies must be done, since in P-ACB technologies there
is no commonly agreed framework to identify the pros and the cons. Similar
to P-ABCs, in VANETs due to the lack of a real implementations, security ap-
proaches are generally evaluated via simulations that are often in very controlled
and heterogeneous scenarios, thus the need of establishing a common framework





• Jetzabel Serna-Olvera, Valentina Casola, Massimiliano Rak, Jesus Luna,
Manel Medina, Nicola Mazzocca. Performance Analysis of an OCSP-Based
Authentication Protocol for VANETs. International Journal of Adaptive,
Resilient and Autonomic Systems, Vol. 3, No. 1. (2012), pp 19-45
• V. Casola, J. Serna, J. Luna, M. Rak and M. Medina. An Interoperability
System for Authentication and Authorization in VANETs. International
Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems, Vol. 3,
No. 2. (2010), pp. 115-135.
• J. Serna, J. Luna and M. Medina. Geolocation-based Trust for Vanets
Privacy. International Journal of Information Assurance and Security, Vol
4 No. 5. (2009), pp. 432-439.
A.2 Conference
• Serna, J., Luna, J., Medina, M.: Geolocation-based Trust for Vanet’s Pri-




• Serna, J., Luna, J., Medina, M.: Trust Management and Privacy for Vehic-
ular Ad-Hoc Networks. IXI Jornadas de Paralelismo (JP’08).
A.3 Book Chapter
• J. Serna, J. Luna, R. Morales and M. Medina. Analyzing the trade-offs be-
tween security and performance in VANETs. Accepted for Wireless Tech-
nologies in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: Present and Future Challenges.
Ed. IGI-Global, March 2011.
A.4 Technical Reports
• Serna, J., Luna, J., Medina, M.: A Survey of Security, Trust and Privacy
for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks. REF: UPC-DAC-RR- XCSD-2008. UPC
(2008).
• Serna, J., Luna, J., Medina, M.: Trust Management and Privacy for Vehicu-




Aijaz, A., Bochow, B., Dötzer, F., Festag, A., Gerlach, M., Kroh, R.
& Leinmüller, T. (2006). Attacks on inter vehicle communication systems -
an analysis. In In Proc. WIT , 189–194. 17, 22
Armstrong, L. (2012a). Dedicated short range communications (dsrc).
http://www.leearmstrong.com/DSRC/DSRCHomeset.htm. 11
Armstrong, L. (2012b). Dedicated short range communications (dsrc). 91
Behrisch, M., Bieker, L., Erdmann, J. & Krajzewicz, D. (2011). Sumo
- simulation of urban mobility: An overview. In SIMUL 2011, The Third In-
ternational Conference on Advances in System Simulation, Barcelona, Spain.
87
Beresford, Alastair, R. & Stajano, F. (2003). Location privacy in perva-
sive computing. IEEE Pervasive Computing , 2, 46–55. 23
Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D. & Lambert, P. (2002). Use of elliptic
curve cryptography (ecc) algorithms in cryptographic message syntax (cms).
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3278.txt. 85
Boneh, D. & Franklin, M.K. (2003). Identity-based encryption from the weil
pairing. SIAM J. Comput., 32, 586–615. 27
Borsetti, D., Fiore, M., Casetti, C. & Chiasserini, C. (2009). Coop-
erative support for localized services in vanets. International Symposium on
Modeling Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems . 65, 94
99
REFERENCES
C2CCC (2012). Car to Car Communication Consortium. http://www.car-to-
car.org/. 11
Camenisch, J., Krontiris, I., Lehmann, A., Neven, G., Paquin, C.,
Rannenberg, K. & Zwingelberg, H. (2012). Architecture for attribute-
based credential technologies. 54, 55
Casola, V., Luna, J., Manso, O., Mazzocca, N., Medina, M. & Rak,
M. (2007a). Interoperable grid pkis among untrusted domains: an architectural
proposal. In Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Advances in grid
and pervasive computing , GPC’07, 39–51, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.
43
Casola, V., Mazzeo, A., Mazzocca, N. & Vittorini, V. (2007b). A
security metric for public key infrastructures. Journal of Computer Security ,
15. 35, 43
Casola, V., Mazzocca, N., Luna, J., Manso, O. & Medina, M. (2007c).
Static evaluation of certificate policies for grid pkis interoperability. In ARES ,
391–399, IEEE Computer Society. 32, 41
Chaum, D. & Heyst, E.V. (1991). Group signatures. In Proceedings of the 10th
annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic
techniques , EUROCRYPT’91, 257–265, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.
26
Choi, J.Y., Jakobsson, M. & Wetzel, S. (2005). Balancing auditability
and privacy in vehicular networks. In A. Boukerche & R.B. de Araujo, eds.,
Q2SWinet , 79–87, ACM. 24
Committee, I. (2007). Ieee std 1609.3 - ieee trial-use standard for wireless access
in vehicular environments. 1, 23, 85, 93
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